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I. INTRODUCTION
Is not marriage an open question, when it is alleged, from the
beginning of the world, that such as are in the institution wish to get
out, and such as are out wish to get in?' From the beginning of time,
the institution of marriage has been the recipient of considerable
philosophy, legislation and, of course, humor. This article will
consider the legislation, jurisprudence, and doctrine surrounding a
putative marriage and will philosophize about its shortfalls, with the
hope that Louisiana will adopt a solution to remedy the inequities
present under the current interpretation and application of the law.
According to secular positive law, marriage is a civil contract
entered into by a man and a woman pursuant to the laws of the state
in which they marry.2 Concomitant with the civil contract are civil
effects-the rights and privileges-that both parties enjoy during the
union: legitimate children, the right to support from one's spouse
(both during and after the marriage), the right of one spouse to sue for
the other's wrongful death and the right to the marital portion, to
name a few.3 Any valid marriage will produce civil effects in favor
of both parties as a matter of law.4 By the general rule, parties who
1. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Representative Men 127 (Thomas Y. Crowell &
Company 1891).
2. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 86(1999); Cal. Fam. Code § 300 (1994); Idaho
Code § 32-201 (1996); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 122.010, 122.020 (2001); Wash. Rev.
Code § 26.04.010 (1997); Wis. Stat. § 765.01 (2001). This article will focus on the
law and jurisprudence in the nine community property states, as the right to
community property, in particular, is affected by a putative marriage. Additionally,
the author recognizes that with the advent of civil unions, putative marriage and its
effects may be applicable to other non-traditional relationships. For purposes of
this article, however, focus will remain on marriage between a man and a woman.
3. See infra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 98 (1999) (mutual fidelity, support and
assistance); La. Civ. Code art. 111 (1999) (spousal support); La. Civ. Code art. 179
(1993) (legitimate children); La. Civ. Code art. 889 (2000) (inheritance of
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do not enter into a valid marriage create no civil contract and
therefore are afforded no rights and duties of that marriage.5
The putative marriage rule6 provides the proverbial bridge to civil
effects in the event parties fail in their attempt to contract a valid
marriage, believing in good faith they had done so.7 The putative
marriage rule has been described as "ameliorative or corrective,"
designed to give innocent spouses to a legally null marriage the civil
effects to which parties in a valid marriage enjoy.' In other words, if
one or both of the parties celebrate a marriage, believing it to be
properly contracted in form and in substance, but some legal
impediment plagues its validity, the putative marriage rule would
allow the good faith party or parties to the marriage to enjoy the civil
effects of valid marriage, notwithstanding its invalidity."
community property); La. Civ. Code art. 890 (2000) (surviving spouse usufruct);
La. Civ. Code art. 894 (2000) (inheritance of separate property); La. Civ. Code art.
2315.1 (2003) (survival action); La. Civ. Code art. 2315.2 (2003) (wrongful death
action); La. Civ. Code art. 2336 (1985) (community property); La. Civ. Code art.
2432 (1985) (marital portion); La. R.S. §§ 23:1231, 1251 (1998) (worker's
compensation benefits).
5. Louisiana does not recognize common law marriages. See Succession of
Marinoni, 148 So. 888, 894 (La. 1933). A party who wishes to enter into a
marriage in Louisiana must meet the prerequisites of a valid marriage as prescribed
by the Civil Code. See infra note 7.
6. See La. Civ. Code art. 96 (1999). "Putative" is derived from the Latin
putativus meaning "deemed to be what it is not." 1 Marcel Planiol, Traite
Elmentaire De Droit Civil, no. 1093 (La. State Law Inst. trans., 12th ed. 1939).
7. In Louisiana, the need to rely on the putative marriage rule depends on
which impediment of marriage caused the nullity. Compare La. Civ. Code art. 94
(1999) (absolutely null marriage) with La. Civ. Code art. 95 (relatively null
marriage). Legal impediments to a marriage include a prior undissolved marriage,
marrying certain familial relations, and marriages of the same sex. La. Civ. Code
art. 88 (prior undissolved marriage), La. Civ. Code art. 89 (same sex marriage), La.
Civ. Code art. 90 (familial relationships). In addition, the parties must participate
in a marriage ceremony, the marriage may not be contracted by procuration, and the
parties to a marriage must express their consent to marry. La. Civ. Code art. 91
(marriage ceremony), La. Civ. Code art. 92 (procuration), La. Civ. Code art. 93
(consent). A marriage without the requisite consent to marry will produce a
relatively null marriage and the civil effects will flow to both parties until the
marriage is declared null. La. Civ. Code art. 97. In contrast, an absolutely null
marriage-one entered into in the face of any other impediment to marry
-generally produces no civil effects to either party. La. Civ. Code art. 94; see also
Robert 0. Homes, Jr., Comment, The Putative Marriage Doctrine in Louisiana, 12
Loy. L. Rev. 89, 91-92 (1965).
8. Christopher L. Blakesley, The Putative Marriage Doctrine, 60 Tul. L. Rev.
1, 2 (1985); 1 Planiol, supra note 6, at no. 1094.
9. See La. Civ. Code art. 96; see also King v. Cancienne, 316 So. 2d 366,371
(La. 1975); Cortes v. Fleming, 307 So. 2d 611, 612 (La. 1973); Prince v. Hopson,
89 So. 2d 128, 130 (La. 1956); Succession of Fields, 62 So. 2d 495,499 (La. 1952);
Funderburk v. Funderburk, 38 So. 2d 502, 504 (La. 1949); Succession of Gibson,
173 So. 185,190 (La. 1937); Succession of Marinoni, 164 So. 797,804 (La. 1935);
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What are the civil effects that putative spouses may receive?
Although states that recognize the rule disagree on the breadth of
effects that a putative spouse can receive, spouses can be granted the
legitimacy of the children of the marriage,"0 the right to alimony,"
the right to claim workman's comPensation benefits, 2 the right to a
share of the community property,' the right to inherit as a spouse in
the succession, 4 the right to insurance proceeds as a widow, 5 and
Miller v. Wiggins, 90 So. 109, 111-12 (La. 1921); Waterhouse v. Star Land Co.,
71 So. 358, 359-60 (La. 1916); Smith v. Smith, 10 So. 248, 250 (La. 1891);
Succession of Taylor, 2 So. 581, 583 (La. 1887); Succession of Navarro, 24 La.
Ann. 298, 299 (La. 1872); Abston v. Abston, 15 La. Ann. 137, 139 (La. 1860);
Patton v. Cities of Philadelphia & New Orleans, 1 La. Ann. 98, 105 (La. 1846);
Clendenning v. Clendenning, 3 Mart. (n.s.) 438,444 (La. 1825); Saacks v. Saacks,
688 So. 2d 673, 675-76 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1997), writ denied, 433 So. 2d 152 (La.
1983); Succession of Adger, 457 So. 2d 146, 148 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984);
Succession of Gordon, 461 So. 2d 357, 361-62 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984), writ
denied, 184 So. 2d 735 (La. 1966); Hart v. Hart, 427 So. 2d 1341, 1343-44 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1983); Price v. Price, 326 So. 2d 545, 549 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976);
Succession of Choyce, 183 So. 2d 457, 458-59 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966), writ
denied, 184 So. 2d 735 (La. 1966); Succession ofPrimus, 131 So. 2d 319, 320 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1961); Texas Co. v. Stewart, 101 So. 2d 222, 228 (La. App. Orl.
1958); Eason v. Alexander Shipyards, Inc., 47 So. 2d 114, 117 (La. App. Orl.
1950); Howard v. Ingle, 180 So. 248, 252 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938); Fulton Bag &
Cotton Mills v. Fernandez, 159 So. 339, 342 (La. App. Orl. 1935); Succession of
Lawson, 120 So. 538, 539 (La. App. Orl. 1929); Lee v. Hunt, 483 F. Supp. 826,
841-42 (W.D. La. 1979).
10. See, e.g., Cortes v. Fleming, 307 So. 2d 611, 613 (La. 1973); Succession
of Chavis, 29 So. 2d 860, 862 (La. 1947); Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.040 (1997).
11. See, e.g., Cal. Fam. Code § 2254 (1994); 750 I11. Comp. Stat. 5/305 (1999);
Minn. Stat. § 518.055 (1990); Mont. Code Ann. § 40-1-404 (2001); Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 14-2-111 (1997); Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.040; Cortes, 307 So. 2d at
614-17; King, 316 So. 2d at 370.
12. See, e.g., Cortes, 307 So. 2d at 613; Neureither v. Workmen's Comp.
Appeals Bd., 93 Cal. Rptr. 162, 164-65 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); Ritchie v. Katy Coal
Co., 231 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Ky. 1950); Dawson v. Hatfield Wire & Cable Co., 280
A.2d 173, 177 (N.J. 1971); compare Price v. Travelers Ins. Co., 25 F. Supp. 894,
895-96 (ND. Tex. 1939) (refusing to allow the putative spouse to collect worker's
compensation when the legal spouse was still alive) with Davis v. Davis, 521
S.W.2d 603,606 (Tex. 1975) (expanding the putative marriage rule to give putative
spouses a right to all property-related incidents of marriage, which may include the
right to worker's compensation benefits); Williams v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 670
P.2d 453, 455 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
13. See infra Section IV for a discussion of various state cases.
14. See, e.g., Cortes, 307 So. 2d at 613; compare Fort Worth & R.G. Ry. Co.
v. Robertson, 121 S.W. 202, 203 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909) (refusing to allow the
putative spouse to inherit when the legal spouse was still alive) with Davis, 521
S.W.2d at 606 (expanding the putative marriage rule to give putative spouses a right
to all property-related incidents of marriage, which may include the right to inherit
as a spouse in the succession); Aubrey v. Folsom, 151 F. Supp. 836, 840 (N.D. Cal.
1957).
15. See, e.g., Cortes, 307 So. 2d at 613; Adduddell v. Bd. of Admin., 87 Cal.
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the right to sue for the wrongful death of the other spouse.' 6 The
putative marriage rule has particular application in community
property states, because one of the civil effects of marriage is the
right to one-half of the property acquired during the marriage. 7 This
article will focus on the extent to which this right is afforded
putative spouses and, in some cases, their children."
To explain, let me introduce you to Clementine Prince.
Clementine Prince fell in love with James Brough. 9 Clementine and
James decided to marry and therefore obtained a marriage license
and expressed their consent to wed in a ceremony. They lived
together as husband and wife one day shy of twenty-one years, when
James died. Almost fifteen years after his death, Clementine sought
to borrow money on a piece of property purchased during their
marriage. At the time of the sale, the property was purchased in her
name, as wife of James Brough, although a declaration that it was
her separate property was not included.2" In attempting to determine
her right to alienate the property, Clementine discovered that she
Rptr. 268, 271 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1970) (death benefits under pension plan);
Davis v. Tenn. Life Ins. Co., 562 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
16. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377.60 (2003); King, 316 So. 2d at 371;
Mich. Comp. Laws § 600-1410 (1996); compare Fort Worth & R.G. Ry. Co., 121
S.W. at 203 (refusing to allow the putative spouse to sue for wrongful death) with
Davis, 521 S.W.2d at 606 (expanding the putative marriage rule to give putative
spouses a right to all property-related incidents of marriage, which may include the
right to sue for wrongful death).
Louisiana likewise offers the putative spouse the right to the marital portion when
the spouse is otherwise qualified. See Cortes v. Fleming, 307 So. 2d 611, 613 (La.
1973). This Article will not address the controversy in Louisiana and other states
surrounding the extent of civil effects offered to good faith spouses. For an
excellent discussion of the civil effects, see Blakesley, supra note 8, at 29-52; see
also Ryland Percy, Note, Putative Marriages: What are "Civil Effects?", 36 La.
L. Rev. 704 (1976).
17. See infra Section IV for a discussion of community property states and the
division of community property in the putative marriage context.
18. Absent a legal spouse, the putative spouse has the benefit of all of the civil
effects, including the right to claim his or her one-half share of the community
property. Problems will arise, however, when the common spouse dies leaving
both a legal and a putative spouse. Although the common spouse can bequeath his
or her separate property to the putative spouse by will, if the common spouse dies
intestate or disposes of his or her share of the community property to the putative
spouse by will, the legal wife may have a claim to a portion of the property
acquired during the putative community.
19. These facts are based on the case of Prince v. Hopson, 89 So. 2d 128 (La.
1956).
20. A declaration could provide proof that property acquired by one spouse that
was purchased with that spouse's separate funds and used for that spouse's separate
estate did not become a part of the community between the two spouses. See La.
Civ. Code art. 2402 (1870); Prince, 89 So. 2d at 130-31; Salassi v. Salassi, 57 So.
2d 684, 685 (La. 1952).
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was not legally married to James-a woman by the name of Victoria
Albert was his legal wife.
Victoria Albert had been married to James Brough before he met
Clementine. Victoria and James had been married for five years
when they separated. Seven years later, James filed for divorce and
a preliminary default judgment was entered in the case. A final
judgment of divorce, however, was never obtained. Believing
themselves to be divorced, James later married Clementine and
Victoria married Elijah. Because Clementine's marriage to James
was legally invalid (and Victoria's marriage was legally valid),
Victoria asserted rights to the property that Clementine sought to
alienate. Victoria insisted that as James's legal wife, she was
entitled to one-half of the community property acquired during the
marriage, which did not end until his death.
Does Victoria have an absolute right to her one-half share of the
property as James's legal wife? Does Clementine have any right to
the property as the named purchaser of the property or the putative
spouse of James? Are the rights affected if James or Victoria or
Clementine or more than one of the parties is in bad faith? Do the
rights change if children from either marriage exist?
Some, but not all, of these questions can be answered using the
putative marriage rules. In Louisiana, the rules governing putative
marriage have developed legislatively and jurisprudentially, albeit
at times in misled directions. This article will begin, in Part II, with
the history of putative marriage, from the English law, the Spanish
civil law, and the French civil law. After an historical perspective,
Part I of this article will present the path of Louisiana law. The
cases of Patton v. Cities of Philadelphia and New Orleans2 and
Prince v. Hopson22 will be examined and at times criticized for the
inequitable treatment given to the innocent, putative spouse and
children of the putative marriage. After a discussion of the current
state of the law in Louisiana, Part IV will consider the law of other
states to give context and to offer possible solutions to Louisiana's
treatment of a putative marriage. Finally, to cure the current pitfalls
present in the law, in Part V the author will advocate the enactment
of a "putative divorce," with the hope that it can be implemented by
the legislature or through judicial ingenuity if the case arises.
Recognizing a putative divorce will not only complement putative
marriage but will provide fairness and equality among the spouses
and the children affected by the division of property present under
the law today.
21. 1 La. Ann. 98 (1846).
22. 89 So. 2d 128 (La. 1956).
[Vol. 64
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II. THE HISTORY OF PUTATIVE MARRIAGE
The recognition of putative marriage crosses both civil and
common law lines. Although generally believed to have its roots in
the civilian traditions, putative marriage has been traced to early
English law as well.23 As discussed in more detail below, protecting
a child's legitimacy when born of an invalid marriage spawned the
protection of spouses entering into an invalid marriage.
A. English Law
Putative marriages had been recognized as early as the twelfth
century in canon law.24 During the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries, the law of England relied on the canon law and recognized
that even though a marriage could be declared null based on a prior
undissolved marriage or consanguinity (marriage of blood relations),
some civil effects of that marriage would flow to the spouses in good
faith and their children.25 Specifically, scholars of the English law
explained that if a woman in good faith married a man who was
already married, any children from him would be legitimate and
capable of inheriting from both parents.26 Outside of the legitimacy
of children, however, the English law did not focus on any other civil
effects, but recognized the need for some equitable complement to
marriage when the parties, albeit in good faith, entered into a legally
invalid marriage. This rule, however, was abandoned in later English
history.27
23. See 1 Planiol, supra note 6, at no. 1094; Blakesley, supra note 8, at 7.
24. 2 Sir Frederick Pollock & Frederic W. Maitland, The History of English
Law 375-77 (2d ed. 1898, Cambridge reprint 1968). Like the classic civil law,
good faith was required to produce civil effects, but canon law also required the
public celebration of the marriage and a just cause for the mistake. 1 Planiol, supra
note 6, at no. 1095. Planiol noted, however, that even though public celebration
and just cause are technically absent from the civilian doctrine, in practice these
requirements impact a finding of good faith. Id. at no. 1101, 1103. In fact,
according to some civilian doctrine, the parties must "contract" a marriage in good
faith, which has been interpreted to mean that some celebration of marriage must
take place. Id. at no. 1107; Charles D. Marshall, Comment, The Necessity of
Ceremony in a Putative Marriage, 10 Tul. L. Rev. 435, 437 nn. 12, 14 (1936); but
see Succession of Marinoni, 164 So. 797, 804 (La. 1935) (recognizing a putative
marriage even though no ceremony took place).
25. Id. For a compilation of citations discussing early English law, see
Blakesley, supra note 8, at 7 n.16.
26. 2 Pollock & Maitland, supra note 24, at 375-77. A woman was in good
faith if she believed that her soon-to-be husband was unmarried at the time of their
nuptials.
27. 2 Pollock & Maitland, supra note 24, at 377; Blakesley, supra note 8, at 7.
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B. Spanish Civil Law
Putative marriage was introduced in the Spanish system in Las
Siete Partidas, during the late thirteenth century. Initially, the rule
was not termed "putative marriage," but was inferred from a
provision that deemed children born to good faith parties of an
invalid marriage to be legitimate children.28 If only one of the
spouses was in good faith at the time of the child's birth, the child
would remain legitimate, but after the time that both spouses had
knowledge of an impediment to their marriage, any children
thereafter born would be illegitimate.29 Although the Partidas
contained no provision addressing the parties to the putative marriage
themselves, the law of Spain recognized the right of a spouse to share
in the community property acquired during the putative marriage.3"
The Spanish, however, advanced a novel purpose under the law.
Not only did the Spanish seek to protect the innocent spouse, but the
bigamous spouse was punished for causing the putative spouse to
enter into an invalid marriage.3' Punishment took the form of
brandings, imprisonment, banishment and, most pertinent here, lossf r 32
of property. Under Spanish law, a bigamous husband who died
28. Partida IV, Title XIII, Law I provided:
If between those who are married openly in the face of the church, such
an impediment should exist that the marriage must be annulled on account
of it, the children begotten before it was known that an impediment of this
kind existed will be legitimate. This will also be the case where both
parties did not know that such an impediment existed, as well as where
only one of them knew it, for the ignorance of one alone renders the
children legitimate. But, if after it had been certainly ascertained that such
an impediment existed between the parties, they should have children, all
those born subsequently will not be legitimate.
Las Siete Partidas, Part. IV, Tit. XIII, Law 1 (Scott trans., Burns ed., 2001).
29. Id.; see also L. Julian Samuel, The Necessity for the Continuance of Good
Faith in a Putative Marriage, 6 Tul. L. Rev. 306, 307 (1932). The Partidas
considered the illegitimacy of children born of spouses with knowledge of the
impediment as punishment imposed on such spouses. Las Siete Partidas, Part. IV,
Tit. III, Law III (Scott trans., Burns ed., 2001). Today, the Spanish Civil Code
provides that when bad faith exists on the part of both spouses, the marriage
produces civil effects only with relation to the children. Spanish Civil Code art. 79
(Julio Romanach, Jr. trans., Lawrence Publishing Co. 1994).
30. See Smith v. Smith, 1 Tex. 621, 628 (1846) (noting the incompleteness of
the Partidas and citing the Spanish "El Diccionario de Legislacion" to conclude that
the spirit of Spanish law recognizes the civil effects of matrimony with respect to
the spouses as well as the offspring); see also Patton, 1 La. Ann. at 106.
31. See Patton, 1 La. Ann. at 106; see also Joseph B. Henderson, Comment,
The Civil Effects of a Putative Marriage, 1 Loy. L. Rev. 54, 58 (1941). Initially,
canon law governed civil sanctions in the Partidas. Las Siete Partidas, Introduction
to the Fourth Partida (Scott trans., Burns ed., 2001).
32. 1 White, New Recopilacion 45 (1839) ("That besides the ecclesiastical
[Vol. 64
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leaving both a legal and a putative spouse had to forfeit his share of
the property earned during the putative marriage to his two wives as
compensation for the grievous wrong he committed against the legal• • • 33
wife and for deceiving the good faith, putative wife. Consequently,
one-half of the property acquired during the putative marriage
devolved to the legal spouse and the other half devolved to the
putative spouse.34
C. French Civil Law
The 1804 French Code Napoleon recognized the effects of
putative marriages in the following two articles:
Art. 201. A marriage which has been declared null draws
after it, nevertheless, civil consequences, as well with regard
to the married parties as to their children, where the marriage
has been contracted in good faith.
Art. 202. Where good faith exists only on the part of one
of the married persons, the marriage is only attended by civil
consequences in favor of such persons, and the children of the
marriage.
Good faith was the hallmark of a putative marriage, although
French doctrine accorded children the rights of legitimacy even if
neither parent was in good faith.36 Once a good faith spouse
penalties those who marry clandestinely will also be liable to civil ones; ... but
thus incur the penalty of confiscation of property, banishment, and just cause of
being disinherited."); Id. at 242 ('The married man who lives in concubinage...
and if she is married, he forfeits the half of his property.").
33. 1 White, supra note 32, at 242; see also Patton, 1 La. Ann. at 106. This
punishment theory imposed against unfaithful spouses permeated early Spanish
law. Wives who were guilty of adultery likewise had to forfeit their share of the
acquets and gains acquired during the marriage. See Harriet Spiller Daggett, The
Community Property System of Louisiana with Comparative Studies 117 (1931).
Although Louisiana followed Spanish law for many years, Louisiana law never
accepted this principle. See id. at 117, 123.
34. See Patton, 1 La. Ann. at 106.
35. Code Napoleon, Literally Translated from the Original and Official Edition
(Claitor's Book Store 1960).
36. See 1 Planiol, supra note 6, at no. 1098. The Spanish law, in comparison,
failed to grant legitimacy to children when neither parent was in good faith. See
supra note 29. Although now Spanish law grants civil effects to children born of
bad faith parents, Louisiana law follows the early Spanish approach on this issue.
See supra note 30; see also Prieto v. Succession of Prieto, 115 So. 911, 913 (La.
1928) (concluding that a child born of a putative marriage in which both spouses
were in bad faith was illegitimate). The Persons Committee of the Louisiana Law
Institute has recognized the inequity to the child born of two bad faith parents, but
has yet to craft a solution. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, Revision of the Law of
Marriage: One Baby Step Forward, 48 La. L. Rev. 1131, 1149 n. 129 (1988); see
2003)
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established the putative marriage, the civil effects of the union were
the same as those of a legal marriage.3 7 In French doctrine, unlike its
Spanish law counterpart, the civil effects ended when the marriage
was declared null, rather than when a party's good faith ceased to
exist. 38 Also unlike the Spanish law, French doctrine sought only to
protect the putative spouse; punishing the bigamous spouse was not
its goal.39 In fact, at least one French commentator opined that the
bigamous spouse has an equal right to the property acquired during
the putative union as the good faith spouse because both assisted in
building the community and should be entitled to share in its
rewards.4 °
French commentators spent a considerable amount of time
discussing the inheritance rights of spouses in a putative marriage
when the common spouse died leaving both legal and putative
spouses.4' Denisart, Toullier, and Vazeille advocated a theory akin
to a partnership or an association between two strangers to grant the
legal spouse her share of the community from the inception of her
marriage until the contracting of a putative marriage.42 The good or
also Thomas E. Carbonneau, Analytical and Comparative Variations on Selected
Provisions ofBook One of the Louisiana Civil Code with Special Consideration of
the Role of Fault in the Determination of Marital Disputes, 27 Loy. L. Rev. 999,
1007-13 (1981).
37. Aubry et Rau, 7 Cours de Droit Civil Frangais 75 (5th ed. 1913); C.
Demolombe, 3 Cours de Code Civil § 371 (1846); M.A. Duranton, 1 Cours de Droit
Frangais § 367 (3d ed. 1834). M.F.A. Vazeille, 1 Traits du Mariage § 284 (1825);
M. Toullier, Le Droit Civil Frangais §§ 653, 661 (4th ed. 1824).
38. 1 Planiol, supra note 6, atno. 110; seealso Samuel, supra note 29, at 308;
but see Toullier, supra note 37, at § 656 n.2 (arguing that if spouses receive an
official document or important evidence of the invalidity of the marriage, civil
effects should end at that time, rather than on a declaration of nullity).
39. None of the French writers speak of punishing the husband, only of
offering the civil effects to innocent spouses. See Henderson, supra note 31, at 58
n.25.
40. Aubry et Rau, supra note 37, at 72 n.18; see also Vazeille, supra note 37,
at § 285. The bigamous spouse, however, is not entitled to all of the effects given
to the good faith spouse. The bigamous spouse is denied any right to take in the
inheritance of his putative spouse or children from the putative marriage, even
though the putative wife and the children are entitled to inherit from the bigamous
spouse. 1 Planiol, supra note 6, at no. 11 A; Toullier, supra note 37, at § 663;
Vazeille, supra note 37, at § 286; C. Demolombe, supra note 37, at § 372.
41. The comment by Joseph B. Henderson, The Civil Effects of a Putative
Marriage, 1 Loy. L. Rev. 54 (1941), greatly assisted in the research of this section.
The writer would also like to thank Lambert Boissiere, Patricia Janvier, Philippe
Langlois, and Julie Ell-Lugar for translating the writings of the French scholars
cited below.
42. Denisart, 3 Collection de Jurisprudence 614 (1784); Toullier, supra note
37, at § 665; Vazeille, supra note 37, at § 285. These three French scholars relied
on a case decided in 1584 that awarded half the community of each marriage to the
legal or putative wives, as the case may be, and the other half to the children of the
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bad faith of the common spouse was not considered in the analysis.
The theory was founded, not on the establishment of a community
regime, but on an association between two persons to share the gains
and benefits of their relationship according to the general rules of
society.4 3 The putative spouse received her one-half share of the
community from the inception of her putative marriage until the
contracting of another putative marriage, and so on through several
communities if applicable." Although this theory could have been
couched in terms of multiple communities, each marriage was
described as an association formed with the husband and each wife.45
Each putative spouse received a one-half share of the property
acquired during her association with the common spouse.
The writers diverged, however, on the allocation of the common
spouse's half of the community in each of the different unions.
Denisart and Toullier believed that this one-half of the community
devolved to the children of each respective marriage.47 Vazeille
contended that the children of all of the marriages should share
equally in the community as it existed during all of the marriages, not
just during the marriage from which they were born.48
Amidst this disagreement concerning the common spouse's one-
half of the community emerged concerns about the putative wife.
Demolombe, another leading French scholar, challenged the writings
of Toullier, Vazeille, and Duranton arguing that, under their
"association" theory, the good faith putative wife may be deprived of
the effects of a true marital community.49 According to Demolombe,
a better solution would be to liquidate successively and separately
each of the community regimes beginning with the first legal
marriage and continuing through the second (and possibly third)
putative marriage.5" That way, the econd or subsequent wife would
receive property equal to the property she would have a right to under
her own community property regime.5
particular marriage. Henderson, supra note 31, at 64-65; Toullier, supra note 37,
at § 665; Vazeille, supra note 37, at § 285.
43. Denisart, supra note 42, at 614; Toullier, supra note 37, at § 665; Vazeille,
supra note 37, at § 285.
44. Denisart, supra note 42, at 614; Toullier, supra note 37, at § 665; Vazeille,
supra note 37, at § 285.
45. Denisart, supra note 42, at 614; Toullier, supra note 37, at § 665; Vazeille,
supra note 37, at § 285; Duranton, supra note 37, at § 373 (describing as casual or
conventional community).
46. Later, another French commentator, Duranton, concurred with the opinions
of Denisart, Vazeille, and Toullier. Duranton, supra note 37, at § 373.
47. Denisart, supra note 42, at 614; Toullier, supra note 37, at § 666.
48. Vazeille, supra note 37, at § 285.
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The eventual solution to this dilemma originated with Aubry and
Rau, with whom Planiol and Ripert and Baudry-Lacantinerie
concurred.52 Aubry and Rau agreed with early French commentators
that the husband, whether or not in good faith, was entitled to share
in the community earned with the putative spouse. Accordingly, his
children, including those with the putative spouse, inherited from him
his share in the putative community. 3 Because, however, the legal
wife was legally entitled to one-half of the property acquired during
the existence of both communities (as her legal marriage never
ended), she would receive one-half of the putative wife's share in the
community, or one-quarter of the whole putative community, and the
putative wife would retain the other one-quarter share. 4 In other
words, the putative community would be divided one-half to the
successors of the deceased common spouse, one-fourth to the legal
spouse, and one-fourth to the putative spouse.5
IH. THE TREATMENT OF PUTATIVE MARRIAGE IN LOUISIANA
Louisiana's first interpretation of the putative marriage rule
occurred in 1846, when the court considered Patton v. Cities of
Philadelphia and New Orleans.56 The court relied on Spanish law,
which was in effect in Louisiana at the time of the putative marriage,
to conclude that at the death of the common spouse, the legal and
putative wives shared one-half each the property acquired during the
putative community." Spanish law prevailed even after the putative
marriage rule was codified in Louisiana,5" but French influence
entered the arena. 9 Courts, though, wrestled with the appropriate
legal standard to apply.6° Until 1956, courts consistently applied
52. 1 Planiol, supra note 6, at no. 11 10A; G. Baudry-Lacantinerie, 3 Traite de
Droit Civil 516-19 (3d ed. 1906); M. Planiol et G. Ripert, Traite Pratique de Droit
Civil Frangais § 329 n.1 (1926); Aubry et Rau, supra note 37, at 75-76.
53. Aubry et Rau, supra note 37, at 72 n.18.
54. 1 Planiol, supra note 6, at no. 111 0A; Baudry-Lacantinerie, supra note 52,
at 517-18; Aubry et Rau, supra note 37, at 75-76.
55. 1 Planiol, supra note 6, at no. 11 1OA; Baudry-Lacantinerie, supra note 52,
at 517-18; Aubry et Rau, supra note 37, at 75-76; see also Prince, 89 So. 2d at
133.
56. 1 La. Ann. 98 (1846).
57. Id. at 106.
58. See infra note 75 for cases applying the Patton after codification of the
rule.
59. See Prince, 89 So. 2d at 133.
60. See, e.g., Hubbell v. Inkstein, 7 La. Ann. 252, 253-54 (1852) (concluding
that the reasoning in the Patton case, decided under Spanish law, had equal force
in Louisiana); Prince, 89 So. 2d at 132 (criticizing cases that followed Patton after
Spanish law was abolished and relying on French sources of law).
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Spanish law, but with the case of Prince v. Hopson,6 the Louisiana
Supreme Court reexamined the history and roots of putative marriage
and imported French doctrine.6 2 Now, in the twenty-first century,
Louisiana law remains a convergence of Spanish and French law,
neither of which reaches the appropriate balance between the rights
of a legal spouse, a putative spouse, and the children of the deceased
common spouse.
A. Patton v. Cities of Philadelphia and New Orleans.
The case of Patton v. Cities of Philadelphia and New Orleans63
was the first to consider the division of property when a spouse died
leaving both a legal and a putative spouse. Abraham Morehouse
married Abigail Young in New York and two children were born of
the marriage.' Approximately nine years later, Abraham moved to
Louisiana, represented himself as a widower (although Abigail
Young was still alive and no divorce proceedings had been initiated)
and married Eleonore Hook, his then putative bride." Eleonore had
no knowledge of his prior undissolved union and bore several
children from Abraham.66 Abraham acquired property during his
putative marriage to Eleonore, and after his death a third party
acquired the property from Abigail and her children, who represented
themselves as the only legitimate heirs to Abraham. In the lawsuit,
Eleonore and her children claimed rights to this property.6 7
In its analysis, the court applied Spanish law to determine which
parties had claims to the property acquired during the putative
marriage to Eleonore.6" Abigail, as the legal spouse, had a legal
entitlement to one-half of all property acquired during the legal
marriage and Eleonore, as the putative spouse, had a legal entitlement
to one-half of all property acquired during her putative marriage. The
court concluded that because each wife had a valid claim to the
property, Abigail and Eleonore would each receive an undivided one-
61. 89 So. 2d 128 (La. 1956).
62. Id. at 133.
63. 1 La. Ann. 98 (1846).
64. Id. at 101.
65. Id.
66. The opinion does not make clear how many children were born during
Eleonore's good faith belief that her marriage to Abraham was valid. Ultimately,
because the court refused to recognize the right of Abraham's children to his share
of the community earned during the putative marriage, the court declined to
consider the question. Id. at 105.
67. Id. at 102.
68. Id. at 104-06. Because Spanish law was in place at the time of Abraham's
death in 1813, it was appropriately applied in the case.
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half interest in the property.69 The effect of the court's decision
prevented Abraham's children from inheriting their father's share of
his community.
Implicit throughout the tone of the opinion was the court's intent
to punish the bigamous spouse for his actions, a result that had been
embraced by Spanish law for many years. The court explained:
As the wife, under [the Spanish] laws, forfeits her share of the
acquets and gains when she is guilty of adultery, so the
husband forfeits his share when he has two wives living, and
each of the wives takes the undivided half to which the law
would entitle to her, if she was alone.
From which it results that one-half goes to each of the wives,
and that the husband deceiving the second and doing a
grievous wrong to the first, refuses unjustly to either the share
which belongs to her; and that he is bound to satisfy both out
of everything he possesses, because the law favors those who
are deceived against those who deceive them.70
Because the bigamous husband had committed a grievous wrong
against the first wife and had deceived his second wife by causing her
to enter into a bigamous union with him, his share of the community
property would devolve to them. Nowhere in the opinion did the
court expressly state that Abraham was in "bad faith" when he
married Eleonore knowing his marriage to Abigail was valid, but this
finding was implicit. The court emphasized Abraham's lack of
morality and sought to prevent him from reaping any benefit from his
wrongdoing.
The court's desire to punish Abraham was misplaced. Abraham
was already dead and there were no benefits for him to reap. Rather
than Abraham suffering for his wrongdoing, his children suffered by
failing to inherit in their father's succession.7" The court sought to
address this anomoly in its opinion, suggesting that the inheritance to
the children was not affected, per se, because any debts owed in
Abraham's succession were paid from the assets of Abraham's estate,
the net of which belonged to the children.72 Because the court
69. 1 La. Ann. at 106.
70. Id. (citing Paz, 61 Consultas Varitas 9 at 483-84).
71. Because Abraham died intestate, his legitimate children would succeed to
his share of any community property. See La. Civ. Code art. 27 (1808) (current
version at La. Civ. Code art. 888 (2000)).
72. The court relied on the writing of Paz, a Spanish writer, in his sixty-first
Consultas Varitas. Paz classified the wives as creditors of the husband's estate to
ensure that they received the community property to the detriment of the intestate
heirs. 1 La. Ann. at 106.
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classified Abraham's share of the community as a debt that he owed
to his wives for his wrongdoing, Abraham's children simply took the
net of the estate, none of which was left because it had been paid to
his wives as a debt of his succession.73
Although absent from the court's opinion, the element of "bad
faith" has been lifted from its undertones and relied on in a number of
cases that follow. 74 Courts have consistently relied on the Patton case
to divide the putative community between the legal and putative
spouses when the common spouse enters a second marriage knowing
that his first marriage had not been properly dissolved.75 Even though
the Patton case was decided under Spanish law, its effects, as
discussed in detail below, still permeate Louisiana law.
B. Codification of the Putative Marriage Rule
Louisiana first codified putative marriage in the Civil Code of
1825, taking verbatim the written language from Articles 201 and 202
of the French Code Napoleon.76 Enacted as Articles 119 and 120,
Louisiana law provided:
Article 119. The marriage, which has been declared null,
produces nevertheless its civil effects as it relates to the parties
and their children, if it has been contracted in good faith.
Article 120. If only one of the parties acted in good faith,
the marriage produces its civil effects only in his or her favor,
and in favor of the children born of the marriage.77
Not addressed in the passage of these articles was the effect on
children born of spouses who entered the marriage in bad faith.
Rather than adopting the French interpretation, the Louisiana
73. Id.
74. Prince, 89 So. 2d at 132; Gathright v. Smith, 368 So. 2d 679, 682 (La.
1978); Cortes, 307 So. 2d at 616; Succession of Marinoni, 164 So. at 804; Price,
326 So. 2d at 549-50; Succession of Choyce, 183 So. 2d at 459.
75. See, e.g., U.S.v. Robinson, 40F.2d 14, 17 (5thCir. 1930);Funderburk, 38
So. 2d at 504; Ray v. Knox, 113 So. 814 (1927); Succession of Fields, 62 So. 2d at
499; Waterhouse, 71 So. at 359-60; Jerman v. Tenneas, 11 So. 80, 83 (1892);
Succession of Navarro, 24 La. Ann. at 300; Abston, 15 La. Ann. at 140; Hubbell,
7 La. Ann. at 253; Price, 326 So. 2d at 549; Succession of Choyce, 183 So. 2d at
459; Jackson v. Gordon, 186 So. 399 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1939); Overton v. Brown,
3 La. App. 591 (1st Cir 1926); Succession of Devezin, 7 Teiss. 111, 115 (La. App.
1910).
76. Code Napoleon, supra note 35, arts. 201, 202; see Additions and
Amendment to the Civil Code of the State of Louisiana at 10 (1822), commonly
referred to as the Projet of the Civil Code of 1825 (hereinafter Projet of the Civil
Code of 1825); see also King, 316 So. 2d at 371; Succession of Marinoni, 164 So.
at 804.
77. La. Civ. Code arts. 119, 120 (1825).
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judiciary interpreted these articles consistent with the Spanish law in
force in 1825, which denied legitimacy to children born of two bad
faith spouses.7"
In 1870, the articles were renumbered to articles 117 and 118 but
the language did not change.79 In the revision of 1987, the legislature
passed article 96, which reproduced the substance of articles 117 and
118, but contained a change that allows civil effects to continue in
favor of a putative spouse regardless of whether the putative spouse
remains in good faith when the cause for nullity of the marriage is the
other party's prior undissolved marriage.80 Because the spouse in
good faith is unable to rectify the impediment of the prior
undissolved marriage, only that spouse can enjoy the ongoing civil
effects of the marriage even after obtaining knowledge of the
impediment.8' Article 96 remains the law today.82
Post codification of the putative marriage rule, Louisiana courts
have continued to refer to Spanish and French sources to aid in their
analysis.8 3 Although the substance of the rule has changed slightly,
78. See Projet of the Civil Code of 1825, which contains the observation that
Louisiana law fails to explain how children of a null marriage are treated. The
observation then expounds, "This is provided by the first law, tit. 13, part. 4, to
which these articles are confirmable." Las Siete Partidas, Part IV, Tit. XIII, Law 1,
supra note 28, denies legitimacy to children born of two bad faith spouses.
Accordingly, Louisiana adhered to the early Spanish treatment of children born of
two bad faith spouses, rather than the more liberal French interpretation, which
granted legitimacy to those children. See also Prieto, 115 So. at 913; Samuel,
supra note 29, at 309.
79. La. Civ. Code arts. 117, 118 (1870).
80. La. Civ. Code art. 96. The article provides:
An absolutely null marriage nevertheless produces civil effects in favor of
a party who contracted it in good faith for as long as that party remains in
good faith.
When the cause of the nullity is one party's prior undissolved marriage,
the civil effects continue in favor of the other party, regardless of whether
the latter remains in good faith, until the marriage is pronounced null or
the latter party contracts a valid marriage.
A marriage contracted by a party in good faith produces civil effects in
favor of a child of the parties.
A purported marriage between parties of the same sex does not produce
any civil effects.
Id.; see generally Spaht, supra note 36, at 1149-53 for a discussion of the changes
brought about by Article 96.
81. La. Civ. Code art. 96 cmt. b.
82. 1987 La. Acts 886.
83. See, e.g., Cortes, 307 So. 2d at 615-16 (considering French law to
determine whether, under the putative spouse doctrine, a putative spouse is entitled
to alimony); Smith, 10 So. at 250 (considering the language of Marcade when
commenting on the French Code to determine the meaning of civil effects);
Hubbell, 7 La. Ann. at 254 (noting that Spanish law was no longer in force but
concluding that that the legal principle was still in force to split the putative
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Louisiana adheres to the classic understanding of putative marriage,
with its foundation in statutory law, rather than in equity. 4 Under the
Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Prince v. Hopson, however,
it appeared that equity-albeit unspoken-began to enter into the
analysis.
C. Prince v. Hopson: The Good Faith Spouse
From the Supreme Court's decision in Patton until the mid-
1900s, courts applied and expounded on what became a settled rule:
when a second marriage is contracted without the first being
dissolved, the community property acquired during the coexistence
of the two marriages belongs exclusively and in equal shares to the
legal and putative spouses, as long as the putative spouse is in good
faith; in turn, the bigamous spouse has no share in the property. ' In
1956, the Supreme Court was faced with a set of facts that stretched
the boundaries of this rule.
In Prince v. Hopson, the "bigamous" husband married his second
wife based on the erroneous belief that the divorce from his first wife
was legally valid. 6 James Brough was married to his first wife for
twelve years (living with her for only five of those years) and filed
for a divorce.87 One daughter was borne of that marriage." Although
he received a preliminary judgment of divorce, a final decree was
never rendered.89 Based on what he believed to be a valid divorce, he
entered into another marriage with Clementine, his putative wife.9"
James lived with Clementine for twenty-one years until his death.9'
Fifteen years after his death, she attempted to borrow money on
property purchased by her in her name during their putative
marriage. At this time, James's first wife, who herself had
remarried based on the invalid divorce, asserted rights to one-half of
the property, citing Patton.93
community between the legal and putative spouses).
84. See Blakesley, supra note 8, at 31-32.
85. See supra note 75.
86. For a more detailed explanation of the facts in Prince, see supra note 19
and accompanying text.
87. Prince, 89 So. 2d at 129.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 130.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Prince, 89 So. 2d at 130. Although Clementine purchased the property at
issue in her name, she failed to sign a declaration that the property should remain
in her separate estate. Id. at 130. Without the declaration, Clementine was unable
to overcome the presumption that the property purchased in her name was
community property. Id. at 130-31.
93. Id. at 130-32.
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Most troublesome to the court was James's good faith belief that
he entered a valid marriage with Clementine. Under article 117 of
the Civil Code (now article 96), a marriage produces civil effects in
favor of parties and their children if the marriage was contracted in
good faith.94 Based on James's good faith, he and hence his daughter,
as the heir to his estate, were entitled to civil effects-one of which
was community property-from the putative marriage. According to
the court, the Patton decision could not be reconciled with the
express provisions of the Civil Code when both of the putative
spouses were in good faith:
To follow the Patton rule in the instant case and to give to the
putative wife the husband's one-half of the property acquired
during the existence of the putative community would be to
deny him and his heirs the civil effects of the second
marriage, in the teeth of the provisions of Article 117.9'
The court recognized three competing interests to the putative
community under the law: first, the legal wife was entitled to one-
half of any property acquired during the community;" second, the
good faith common spouse was entitled to one-half of any property
acquired during the existence of the putative community;" and third,
the good faith putative spouse was entitled to one-half of any
property acquired during the existence of the putative community."
The court concluded that when James died, one-half of the property
fell into his succession and could be inherited by his heir.99 The court
then was faced with a quandary: two spouses each entitled to one-
half of the putative community."
There are many paths the court could have taken. The court
could have denied the legal wife the ability to challenge the putative
marriage because after the purported divorce, she had also
94. Id. at 132.
95. Id.
96. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2334, 2402 (repealed 1979) (current version at La.
Civ. Code arts. 2336, 2338, 2339 (1985)).
97. See La. Civ. Code art. 117 (repealed 1987) (current version at La. Civ.
Code art. 96 (1999)).
98. See id.; see also Henderson, supra note 31, at 56 (noting that "the amount
of the claims, all equal in the law, is greater than the amount with which to satisfy
the claims .... ).
99. Prince, 89 So. 2d at 132. The court gave no reason why it satisfied James's
share of the community property first. See Fred R. Godwin, Community Property
-Distribution of Property Acquired During Existence of a Putative Marriage, 17
La. L. Rev. 489, 491 n.8 (1957).
100. Prince, 89 So. 2d at 133. ("The provisions of our law which give to each
of these wives one-half of the property are of equal dignity and rank.").
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remarried.' O' It did not. The court could have applied the Patton rule
and awarded one-half of the property to each of the wives. It did not.
The court could have reduced ratably each party's share of the whole
to one-third and split the putative community equally. It did not.
Rather, the court took the approach advanced by French
commentators, Aubry and Rau, Baudry-Lacantinerie, Colin and
Capitant, and Ripert and Boulanger. 2 Under the French approach,
the common spouse, James in this case, received his one-half of the
putative community, which because of his death would be inherited
by his daughter. In what has been termed an "equitable" solution, the
other one-half of the putative community was divided between the
legal and putative wives, each receiving one-fourth.'0 3
The court's approach and the approach of other courts to follow
are flawed in many respects and yield an inequitable result to the
good faith putative spouse and a windfall to the legal spouse."° The
putative spouse enters the marriage in good faith, believing her union
to be legally valid. At the death of her bigamous husband, she not
only learns that her marriage was invalid, but the putative spouse rule
that should give her the same rights as a legal spouse requires that she
share her one-half of the community property with a woman that she
did not know existed. The facts present in the Prince case illuminate
this inequity and the legal problems with the result.
1. One continuous community
In Prince, the court assumed that the parties contributed to one
continuous community, which began at the inception of the legal
marriage and ended at the death of the common spouse. Essentially,
the court allowed all three parties to contribute to one community, the
ultimate division of which forms the problem. The more sound
101. See Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Gordon, 254 P.2d 644, 649 (Cal. Ct. App.
1953) (denying legal wife claim over putative community because she purported
to enter into another marriage); Brown v. Brown, 82 Cal. Rptr. 238, 245-46 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1969) (concluding that legal wife's acquiescence in putative wife's
twenty-eight year marriage equitably estopped legal wife from claiming any interest
in the community).
102. Prince, 89 So. 2d at 133.
103. Id. at 133-34.
104. The Second Circuit in Succession of Gordon, 461 So. 2d 357 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1984) considered a case with facts similar to those in Prince. In Gordon, the
good faith, common spouse lived with his legal wife for five years and had one
daughter, then lived with his putative spouse for thirty eight years and had nine
children. Id. at 358. The sole asset of the common spouse's succession was
property purchased two years after the putative marriage. Id. at 358-59. The court
awarded one-half of the property to all of the common spouse's children and split
the remaining one-half (one-quarter each) to the legal and putative spouse. Id. at
365 (relying on Prince).
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approach under the law recognizes two separate communities: the
legal one and the putative one, with the putative divorce separating
the two.
Under the Prince rationale, the common spouse, as long as he is
in good faith, retains a one-half share of the entire, continuous
community." 5 The legal spouse also receives a one-half share of the
community property acquired during the marriage prior to the
inception of the putative marriage. Once the putative community
begins, however, the legal spouse retains a one-quarter share of the
property acquired during the putative marriage-a marriage to which
the legal spouse does not contribute. Rightfully so, the putative
spouse is not entitled to any property acquired prior to the inception
of the putative marriage, but once the putative marriage begins, the
putative spouse's one-half share, to which she is entitled as a good
faith spouse, is reduced to one-quarter. Therein lies the problem: the
putative spouse is forced to give up half of her share to a person who
has failed to contribute whatsoever to the putative community.
Rather than have three parties taking from one continuous
community, the Civil Code supports the existence of two separate
communities. The first article in the Matrimonial Regimes Title of
the Civil Code provides that "[a] matrimonial regime is a system of
principles and rules governing the ownership and management of the
property of married persons as between themselves and toward third
persons."'0 6 A community7 consists of certain assets and liabilities of
two spouses-not three.' 7 The fundamental basis of marriage and
the family recognizes this union between two spouses."'
Additionally, nothing in the Matrimonial Regimes Title of the Civil
Code suggests that there can be only one community. The principles
of matrimonial regimes can be extended to two communities,
especially in the context of putative marriages. Indeed, the Supreme
Court in Patton recognized the existence of separate communities.'09
105. The continuous community begins at the legal marriage and ends at death
and consists of the legal and the putative communities.
106. La. Civ. Code art. 2325 (1985).
107. The Code recognizes that third persons have a relationship toward the
spouses as a couple, not along with the spouses. See id.; Robert A. Pascal, Putative
Marriage and Community Property, 17 La. L. Rev. 303, 303 (1957) ("[T]he
community by definition can consist only of property acquired by either or both
these spouses. If property is acquired by a third person, as in this case the putative
wife, it cannot possibly fall into the community between the legal spouses.").
108. For an interesting discussion on the essence of community property and its
deficiencies, see Michael McAuley, The Wanting of Community, in Papers of the
International Academy of Estate and Trust Law (Rosalind F. Atherton ed., Kluwer
Law International, The Hague 2004) (forthcoming 2004).
109. The court referenced the laws of Spain when stating that two separate
communities can exist. Patton, 1 La. Ann. at 105-06. Indeed, the court seemed to
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Once two separate communities exist, a more reasonable division
of property will result. Using a mechanism, such as a putative
divorce, that would cause the legal community to end and the
putative community to begin would allow two parties-and only the
two parties to the marriage-to contribute to their respective
community.'"' For example, during the existence of the legal
marriage, the legal spouse and the common spouse would acquire
property, and each would have a claim to one-half of that community.
Once the putative marriage began, the common and the putative
spouse would acquire property, and each would have a claim to one-
half of that community.' Essentially, the common spouse would
receive the same share as he did under the Prince division, but the
legal spouse would no longer receive the windfall from the putative
spouse's share. 1
2
Consider the specific scenario in Prince, which highlights the
inequity to the putative spouse. The property at issue in Prince was
purchased by Clementine, the putative spouse, in her name." 3
Because property purchased in the name of either spouse is presumed
to be community,"' the property entered the putative community."'
acknowledge the exact division of communities advocated in this article. In Patton,
the plaintiffs were the heirs of Abraham (the common spouse) from his marriage
to his legal wife. The court concluded that the heirs would not succeed to
Abraham's share of the community property from the putative marriage. But, the
court recognized that those same heirs would succeed to Abraham's share of the
community property from the legal marriage, thereby recognizing the existence of
two separate communities -one from which the heirs could take and the other the
heirs could not. Id. at 104-06; see also Succession of Barry, 20 So. 656, 658 (La.
1896) (awarding court costs to each wife because the lawsuit benefited both
communities).
110. Article 2338 defines community property as "property acquired during the
existence of the legal regime through the effort, skill, or industry of either spouse,"
further suggesting that two spouses, not three, are active participants to the
community. La. Civ. Code art. 2338 (1984).
111. It is interesting to note, too, that fruits from a spouse's separate property
enter the community between the two spouses. See La. Civ. Code art. 2339.
Dividing the two communities, therefore, would also protect one spouse's fruits
from being shared with the other, non-participating spouse.
112. See Godwin, supra note 99, at 492 for an excellent discussion of the
manner in which spouses contribute to a community when two communities exist.
113. Prince, 89 So. 2dat 130.
114. Id.; see La. Civ. Code art. 2340 ("Things in the possession of a spouse
during the existence of a regime of community of acquets and gains are presumed
to be community, but either spouse may prove that they are separate property.").
115. The trial court recognized Clementine as the sole owner of the property,
concluding that her marriage to James was an absolute nullity and finding James in
bad faith. Prince, 89 So. 2d at 130. Under the putative marriage rule, because
James was in bad faith, he was not entitled to any community rights. When the
Supreme Court concluded that James was in good faith, he became entitled to
community acquisitions as a putative spouse-a result that ultimately harmed
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How then could Clementine purchase a piece of property that entered
the legal wife's community if a community consists of assets of
liabilities of two spouses? Under Prince, the court awarded the legal
wife one-quarter of the property purchased by Clementine.1 6 It
seems illogical that in purchasing property, the putative spouse could
contribute to an unrelated, third party's community."' With two
separate communities, the property purchased by Clementine would
have entered the putative community and she would be entitled to her
entire one-half of that property to the exclusion of the legal wife.
2. Bad faith legal spouse
Under the rule in Prince, a legal spouse, regardless of his or her
good or bad faith, receives one-quarter of the putative community.
Only the putative spouses' good faith is considered in the analysis.
Although the legal wife in Prince believed in good faith that her
divorce was valid (she also contracted a second, putative marriage)," '
consider the bad faith spouse. A legal spouse who is aware of or
causes a faulty divorce nonetheless will be entitled to one-quarter of
any property acquired during the putative community. The bad faith
spouse could be rewarded for his or her silence-a result that bars the
senses."
9
Clementine. Ironically, Clementine could have enjoyed full ownership of the
property purchased in her name by disclaiming her twenty-one year marriage to
James. See Frederick W. Swain, Jr. & Kathryn V. Lorio, 10 Louisiana Civil Law
Treatise: Successions and Donations § 2.15 (1995).
116. Prince, 89 So. 2dat 134.
117. See Godwin, supra note 99, at 493 (criticizing the Prince case's recognition
of a multi-party community).
118. Prince, 89 So. 2d 130.
119. One Louisiana court intimated that a legal spouse in bad faith should not
be able to share in property acquired during the putative marriage. See Succession
of Chavis, 29 So. 2d 860, 864 (La. 1947). In Chavis, the legal wife lived in the
same city as the common and the putative spouses and never raised the issue of her
marriage to the common spouse until after his death. Id. at 864. After noting this
fact, the court stated:
[The legal spouse] does not appear to have contributed a penny to the
acquisition or improvement of the property involved in this suit, but
immediately after his death and for the first time she seems to have
become obsessed with the idea that she was still his community spouse
and as such entitled to one-half of all this property left by him at his death
and which was acquired entirely through the union of the labors of [the
common spouse and the putative wife].
Id.; but see Succession of Gordon, 461 So. 2d at 363-65 (awarding legal spouse
one-quarter of the putative community even though she lived in the same
community as the common and putative spouses and saw them at church outings
from time to time, believing all the while that she and the common spouse had
never been divorced).
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Certainly, a legal spouse in bad faith should not be entitled to
benefit from actual knowledge of an invalid divorce. 2 ° Likewise, a
legal spouse who in good faith believes that the divorce was valid
should not be entitled to benefit from a marriage (the putative one) that
she too believed was properly contracted.' 2' Again, the legal spouse's
entitlement to any part of the putative community is inappropriate.
3. Potential for lost property rights
If the legal spouse is entitled to a portion of the putative
community, then there may be a portion of the legal spouse's putative
community to which the common spouse would have a property right.
The court in Prince failed to consider the inequity to James and his
heirs at the time of his death. In Prince, James's legal wife had also
entered into a putative marriage with a second husband. 22 She and the
second husband, like James and Clementine, created a putative
community. If James's legal wife had died before he did, James would
have a claim to one-quarter of the putative community between her and
her second husband.
Simply because James died first, his heirs may be unable to collect
his one-quarter share of the putative community between his legal wife
and her second husband. Although James's heirs could have attempted
to recover, from the legal wife, James's share of her putative
community at the time of his death, it does not appear that they did. In
fact, it is unclear whether a claim by the heirs would be recognized. If
James's heirs are unable or simply fail to recover the property, the
legal wife not only enjoys a wind0fall, but so does her second husband,
who will not have to forfeit any portion of his share of the putative
community. Both putative spouses are in good faith, yet one must
forfeit half of the community property to which that spouse is legally
entitled. No reason exists for placing one putative spouse in a superior
position than the other.
4. General inequity
Clementine, James's putative wife, lived with him for twenty-one
years, four times longer than he lived with his legal wife. 123 She
120. See Pascal, supra note 107, at 304 (noting that it would be an abuse of the
law to award a legal spouse property acquired during the putative community if the
legal spouse had knowledge of the putative marriage situation and did nothing to
prevent or terminate it); Chavis, 29 So. 2d at 864.
121. See Pascal, supra note 107, at 304-05; see also Prince, 89 So. 2d at 130
(noting that the legal wife believed that she and the common spouse were divorced
and she had contracted a second marriage as well).
122. Prince, 89 So. 2d at 130.
123. Id.
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enjoyed all of the rights and obligations of married life. The couple
acquired property and lived in the community as husband and wife.
Clementine contributed to the community-albeit in a nonmonetary
manner-and she should reap the benefits of the community that she
worked hard to create. 2 4
At the time the Prince case was decided, the traditional notions
of the family were in place: the husband provided for his family and
the wife cared for the children. The husband, as the breadwinner,
was the head of the household and managed the familial finances.
These traditional notions of the family have advanced in our society
today. Many wives provide either second incomes or sole support
for their families. Assume that a putative second wife provided the
sole support for the household and contributed all of the earnings
that entered the community. Under the Prince rationale, the putative
spouse would have to give up one-quarter of her hard earned income
to a legal spouse who did not contribute one penny to the
community. No court would want to deprive the putative
spouse-whether male or female-of one-quarter of his or her
earnings as the provider for the family.12 1 In today's society, this
scenario illuminates the general inequity present in the current
division of a putative community.
5. The State of the Law in Louisiana
In Louisiana, the rules on putative marriage consists of statutory
law infused with judicial and doctrinal opinion. Article 96 of the
Civil Code grants civil effects, one of which is the right to one-half
of the community property of the putative marriage, to a putative
spouse who in good faith enters the marriage believing it to be
valid. 26 This civil effect enjoyed by putative spouses is contained
in article 2336 of the Civil Code, which gives each spouse to a
marriage the right to one-half of the community acquired during the
union.7 The general right of spouses to share in one community
becomes problematic with the addition of a putative spouse. Courts
124. See Succession of Chavis, 29 So. 2d at 864 (denying the legal wife any
right to property acquired during the putative marriage in part because the property
was acquired solely through the labors of the putative spouses); see also Homes,
supra note 7, at 123 (arguing that the very foundation of the community property
system is honoring the equality of the wife in the community relationship as an
equal contributor even if she is not the actual wage-earner).
125. Homes, supra note 7, at 123 (citing cases in which putative husbands, who
were the breadwinners of the family, were not forced to give up a share of the
putative community at the death of his wife, the common spouse).
126. La. Civ. Code art. 96 (1999).
127. La. Civ. Code art. 2336 (1985) ("Each spouse owns a present undivided
one-half interest in the community property.").
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have attempted to reconcile these competing interests by focusing
in on the motivation of the common spouse when entering the
invalid marriage. 2 '
If, for example, C had been married to A but left A without
divorcing her to live with B. He eventually married B, who knew
nothing about A. When C died, based on the judicial interpretation
in Patton, C's heirs would inherit none of the community property
acquired during his community with B. Rather, B would receive
her one-half share of the putative community as the putative spouse
in good faith, and A would receive the other one-half share as his
legal spouse. Because C was in bad faith when he contracted the
second marriage to B, he is required to forfeit the one-half share of
the putative community to which he would have been entitled.
If, however, C entered into the marriage with B in good faith,
believing that he properly arranged for his divorce from A or
believing that A had died, he would enjoy the civil effects of the
marriage, including one-half of the community property earned
during the putative marriage. Neither A nor B would receive the
one-half share to which each is entitled, but the remaining one-half
share would be split among them, fifty-fifty, regardless of length of
the putative marriage or the good or bad faith of the legal spouse.
Louisiana has not yet considered the division of property when
the legal spouse was in bad faith or when the putative spouse was
the sole or primary wage earner in the family. Although the Civil
Code does not provide answers to all of these questions, the
Louisiana judiciary has demonstrated its willingness to deal with
issues of putative marriage when the case arises. 2 9 Many
questions, however, remain unanswered. In searching for the most
legally sound and equitable solution to the division of a putative
community, the best path is often worn by others also searching for
an answer.
IV. THE TREATMENT OF PUTATIVE MARRIAGE IN OTHER STATES
Louisiana is not the only state to have wrestled with the problem
of property division in a putative marriage. Of the nine community
property states, 30 all of them have considered the division of
128. See, e.g., Prince, 89 So. 2d at 131-32 (distinguishing the husband's good
faith when marrying the second spouse from the Patton line of cases in which the
husband contracted the second marriage in bad faith).
129. See, e.g., Prince, 89 So. 2d at 128; Patton, 1 La. Ann. at98; Price, 326 So.
2d at 545.
130. The nine community property states are Arizona, California, Idaho,
Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. The State
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community property in the context of a putative marriage. Some,
of course, consider the issue in more depth than others. With
resounding uniformity, however, each state has relied on equity as
a factor, if not the deciding factor, when assigning property rights
to each spouse.
When relying on equity as the predominant factor in assigning
property rights to putative spouses, most states have rejected the
classic putative marriage rule, which considers the property
acquired during the existence of the putative marriage-just like
property acquired during a legal marriage-to be community
property. Rather than classify property of the putative marriage as
community property, some states have termed it quasi-community,
quasi-marital, or partnership property.' Equity, not the laws of
community property, govern the division, even though the result
under either theory likely will be the same.'32
Courts in Texas and California offer the most extensive
discussion on putative marriage, although courts in Arizona, Idaho,
Nevada, New Mexico, and Washington have broached the issue in
varying degrees.'33 While the approach may differ, courts in each
state generally consider the origin of the rule, its statutory or
common law foundation, and the principles of equity when seeking
a resolution. A study of these decisions provides valuable insight
into, and offers possible solutions for, the pitfalls present in
Louisiana law.
of Alaska has adopted legislation that allows spouses to opt into a community
property regime by entering into a community property agreement or a community
property trust. See Alaska Stat. 34.77.030 (1999). Additionally, Alaska recognizes
invalid marriages once the impediment has been removed. See Alaska Stat. §
25.05.051. It is not clear, however, how property would be distributed among legal
and putative spouses who opted into the community property regime.
131. See infra notes 138, 148, 182 and accompanying text.
132. One author has concluded that Louisiana is the only state that continues to
apply the classic doctrine. See Blakesley, supra note 8, at 31. That same author
has concluded that equitable theories ofrelief are "conceptually inaccurate" because
the putative marriage rule is a matter of substantive law. Id. at 54.
133. Other non-community property states have enacted legislation to provide
for the rights of putative spouses. These statutes are similar to Section 209 of the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, which provides that the rights of a putative
spouse can not supercede the rights of a legal spouse or those acquired by other
putative spouses, but the putative spouse should receive an apportionment of
property as circumstances warrant and in the interests of justice. See, e.g., Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 14-2-111; 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/305; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.055;
Mont. Code Ann. § 40-1-404; see also Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-378 (1999)
(compensating an innocent party to a null marriage). For a collection of cases from
states that have adopted the putative marriage rule or some equitable analogue




Texas, like Louisiana, was initially governed by Spanish law. 34
Relying on Las Siete Partidas, Texas courts applied the classic
putative marriage rule and afforded putative spouses all the incidents
and privileges of a lawful marriage, as long as the putative spouse
acted in good faith.' In 1840, the common law of England
supplanted the Spanish law in Texas, and there was some question
whether putative marriage survived. 36  Texas courts, however,
continued to recognize the putative marriage rule, notwithstanding its
roots in Spanish law. 137 In a landmark case decided in 1905, the
Texas Supreme Court welcomed the putative marriage rule into its
common law and granted innocent, putative spouses the right to
property acquired during the putative marriage in the same way as the
legal spouse. 13
After adoption of English common law, though, Texas courts
relied on equitable principles to divide community property when a
putative spouse was involved. 39 Although in practice the putative
134. Barkley v. Dumke, 87 S.W. 1147, 1148 (Tex. 1905); For a further
discussion of the putative marriage rule in Texas, see Carlson, supra note 195, at
18.
135. Carroll v. Carroll, 20 Tex. 732, 742 (1858) (pre-1840 marriage); Lee v.
Smith, 18 Tex. 141, 143 (1856) (pre-1840 marriage); Smith v. Smith, 1 Tex. 621,
628-29 (1846) (pre- 1840 marriage). The putative marriage rule originated in Texas
in Smith v. Smith, 1 Tex. 621 (1846). The court relied on Las Siete Partidas to
conclude that the end of putative marriage produces the same effects as the end of
a lawful marriage, but the effects will only benefit a spouse who acted in good faith.
Id. at 629. In fact, the court considered the good faith putative spouse to be the
decedent's lawful wife. According to the court, the putative spouse had, "a larger
interest in the property than any other person," because she was married to the
decedent for fifteen years and was the mother of the decedent's children. Id. at 634.
136. Act of Jan. 20, 1840, 1840 Laws of Tex. 3, reprinted in 2 Laws of Tex. 177
(Gammel 1898); see also Routh v. Routh, 57 Tex. 589, 593 (1882) (implying that
the common law of England governed the marriage contract but leaving the
question open).
137. See, e.g., Parker v. Parker, 222 F. 186, 193-94 (5th Cir. 1915); Davis v.
Davis, 521 S.W.2d 603,607-08 (Tex. 1975); Osuna v. Quintana, 993 S.W.2d 201,
210 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999); Garduno v. Garduno, 760 S.W.2d 735, 738, 739 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1988); U.S. Fid. & Guaranty Co. v. Henderson, 53 S.W.2d 811, 816
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
138. Barkley, 87 S.W.2d at 1147-48. The Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed that
holding in 1975 in the case of Davis, 521 S.W.2d at 607-08. A putative marriage
may result either out of a ceremonial marriage or a common law marriage.
Garduno, 760 S.W.2d at 738; Rey v. Rey, 487 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex. Civ. App.
1972).
139. Parker, 222 F. at 193-94; Price v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 25 F. Supp. 894,896
(N.D. Tex. 1939); Routh, 57 Tex. at 602 (Bonner, J., concurring); Fort Worth &
R.G. Ry. v. Robertson, 121 S.W. 202, 206 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909); Morgan v.
Morgan, 21 S.W. 154, 155-56 (Tex. Civ. App. 1892). The court's statements in
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spouse would receive the same treatment if the classic rule had been
applied, Texas courts often granted relief based on partnership
principles or joint ownership principles. 40 In part because the law
was not statutory, remedies reached were often inconsistent in their
rationale. "4
Most interesting is the case of Parker v. Parker,142 which
involved the distribution of the estate of a common spouse whose
legal and putative spouses survived him. In Parker, the common
husband left the legal wife, filed for a divorce (which was found by
the court to be null and void), and married his second, putative wife
with whom he lived until his death. 143 When dividing his community
property, the court recognized the existence of two separate estates:
the first existing between the common spouse and the legal wife until
the time of the putative marriage and the second beginning from the
date of the putative marriage until the death of the common spouse.'44
The legal wife was entitled to one-half of all of the community
property from the first estate and the putative wife was entitled to
one-half of all of the community property from the second estate.
41
As to the other half of the second estate, the court concluded that the
legal wife and the heirs of the common spouse were entitled to split
the remaining one-half, each receiving a one-quarter share. 146 As
Morgan v. Morgan, 21 S.W. at 156-57, underscore the importance of equity in its
decision:
property acquired in this state, under our community laws, by a man
and woman living together as husband and wife, should belong to them
in equal shares, whether they were legally married or not; and why
should this not be so, especially when they have attempted to enter into
a marriage contract, and believed that they were lawfully husband and
wife? . . . How then, can it be said that the property acquired in
pursuance of such contract shall belong to one of the parties more than
the other?
140. Routh, 57 Tex. at 595 (partnership theory applied to allow relief); Garduno,
760 S.W.2d at 739 (property acquired during putative marriage is jointly owned
separate property); Matthews v. Matthews, 292 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tex. Civ. App.
1956) (property acquired during the putative marriage is jointly owned separate
property); Hupp v. Hupp, 235 S.W.2d 753, 756 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (each
putative spouse is entitled to half of the joint accumulations); Little v. Nicholson,
187 S.W. 506, 507-08 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) (each putative spouse is entitled to
half of the joint or partnership property between the two).
141. See Blakesley, supra note 8, at 10.
142. 222 F. 186 (5th Cir. 1915) (applying Texas law).
143. Id. at 188-90. The divorce was annulled because the grounds alleged for
divorce were false and service was insufficient. Id. at 189.
144. Id. at 194.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 195; see also Routh, 57 Tex. at 602 (Bonner, J. concurring)
(concluding that the putative spouse was entitled to one-half of the property
acquired during the putative community and the other half constitutes the net
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equity played an important role, the court noted that even though the
legal marriage guaranteed the legal wife her share of community
rights, her rights concerning the second estate should be, subject to
"the just and equitable claim of the putative wife."'147
B. California
The origin of putative marriage in California likewise rests with
Spanish law, but California courts have relied on equitable principles
rather than its Spanish legal foundation to award putative spouses a
share of the community property. 4 8 In 1969, California codified the
rule that gave putative spouses the rights of legal spouses, as long as
either or both believed in good faith that the marriage was valid. 149
Amended in 1994, the law provides that the putative spouses divide
property acquired during the putative marriage, but the law calls this
property "quasi-marital property," rather than community property. 5 0
Under California law, true community property exists only when
there is a legal marriage, so "quasi-marital property" is used to give
the same legal effect to the putative spouses.
community property of the legal marriage, entitling the legal spouse to one-half and
the heirs of the decedent to the other); Morgan, 21 S.W. at 155 (same).
147. Id.; see also Lee v. Lee, 247 S.W. 828, 833 (Tex. 1923), in which the court
granted the putative spouse one-half of all the community property acquired during
the existence of the putative marriage, noting that she had no right to any of the
separate property of the common spouse or any of the community property the
common spouse shared with his legal wife.
148. Schneider v. Schneider, 191 P. 533, 535 (Cal. 1920); Coats v. Coats, 118
P. 441, 444 (Cal. 1911); In re Krone's Estate, 189 P.2d 741, 742 (Cal. Ct. App.
1948); Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 69 P.2d 845, 848 (Cal. Ct. App. 1937); Fieg v.
Bank of Arn., 54 P.2d 3, 8 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936); Figoni v. Figoni, 295 P. 339 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1931); Macchi v. La Rocca, 201 P. 143, 144 (Cal. Ct. App. 1921); see also
Blakesley, supra note 8, at 12, 33-34.
149. Cal. Civ. Code § 4452 (repealed 1994).
150. Cal. Fain. Code § 2251 (1994), which provides:
(a) If a determination is made that a marriage is void or voidable and the
court finds that either party or both parties believed in good faith that the
marriage was valid, the court shall:
(1) Declare the party or parties to have the status of a putative spouse.
(2) If the division of the property is an issue, divide in accordance with
Division 7 (commencing with Section 2500), that property acquired during
the union which would have been community property or quasi-
community property if the union has not been voidable. This property is
known as "quasi-marital property."
Id. Section 2550 of the California Family Code makes clear that community
property is divided equally. Cal. Fam. Code § 2550 (1994).
151. In re Estate of Vargas, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779, 780 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974);
Blanche v. Blanche, 160 P.2d 136, 145 (Cal. Ct. App. 1945); Blakesley, supra note
8, at 32 n. 143. At least one court in California has relied on partnership principles
to award the putative spouse a portion of the community property. See Sousa v.
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As far as the division of quasi-marital property, one-half of the
property belongs to the putative spouse, and one-half belongs to the
legal community. 52 The share that belongs to the legal community
is distributed to the legal spouse and the common spouse like any
other community property under the circumstances.' 53 In other
words, of the remaining one-half (belonging to the legal community),
the common spouse has testamentary capacity over one-half of the
property, and the legal spouse is entitled to the other half.5 4 If the
common spouse dies intestate, according to California law, his share
devolves to the surviving spouse.'55
In the case of Estate ofRicci, two surviving widows each claimed
an interest in the common spouse's intestate succession.156 One child
was born of the putative marriage, and all of the property at issue was
purchased during the putative community.' The court concluded
that the putative spouse, who was in good faith, was entitled to her
one-half share of the community earned while she was married to the
decedent, and the legal spouse as the "surviving spouse" under
intestacy was entitled to the other half of the putative community.'
When the common spouse left a will bequeathing all of his
property to his putative spouse, the court in Sousa v. Freitas
concluded that the putative wife was entitled to her one-half of the
property because she was in good faith.'59 As to the other half,
Freitas, 89 Cal. Rptr. 485, 489 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) ("In effect, the innocent
putative spouse was in partnership or a joint enterprise with her spouse,
contributing her services-and in this case her earnings-to the common enterprise.
... Upon death of the husband, only his half interest is considered as community
property, to which the rights of the lawful spouse attach.").
152. Estate of Ricci, 19 Cal. Rptr. 739, 740-41(Cal. Ct. App. 1962) (citing
Professor Burby, Professor of Law at the University of Southern California in
Family Law for California Lawyers 359-60); Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Gordon,
254 P.2d 644, 649-50 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953); Sousa, 89 Cal Rptr. 485 at 488-89.
153. Ricci, 19 Cal. Rptr. at 741; Union Bank & Trust, 254 P.2d 644 at 649;
Sousa, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 488-89; see also Cal. Civ. Prac. Family Law Litigation §
20:108 (2003).
154. Sousa, 89 Cal. Rptr. 485 Cal. Rptr. at 488-89; see also Cal. Civ. Prac.
Family Law Litigation § 20:108 (2002).
155. Cal. Prob. Code § 100 (2002); Cal. Prob. Code § 6401 (1991).
156. Ricci, 19 Cal. Rptr. at 740.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 741-42; see also Estate ofFoy, 204 P.2d 685 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952) (in
a contest between the putative spouse and the child of decedent from his prior
marriage, the court awarded the putative spouse all of the property acquired during
the invalid marriage because the decedent died intestate); In re Krone's Estate, 189
P.2d at 741 (same). According to California Probate Code section 201 (now section
100), in the absence of a testamentary disposition, the decedent's share of the
community property devolves to the surviving spouse. Cal. Prob. Code § 201
(repealed 1983) (current version at Cal. Prob. Code §§ 100, 6401).
159. Sousa, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
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however, the court allowed the decedent to bequeath his half to the
putative wife and awarded the legal wife the other half (or one-
quarter of the whole). 6 Therefore, the putative spouse received
three-quarters of the community acquired during the putative
marriage, and the legal spouse received the other one-quarter.' 6'
Although courts in California award the good faith putative spouse
one-half of the quasi-martial property, equitable principles assist in
dividing the other half.16
2
C. Arizona
Technically, Arizona does not recognize the putative marriage
rule. Although the Arizona Supreme Court has cited precedent from
other states on the putative marriage rule, 63 and has referred to
"putative marriages" in its opinions," courts will not recognize it as
a part of Arizona law. 65 Because of the inherent inequity in refusing
to award an innocent spouse some property earned during an invalid
union, some courts have allowed a purported spouse to equitably
recover property that she contributed to the purported community.
Although Arizona refuses to attach any community property rights to
160. Id. at 489-90.
161. Id.
162. See Estate of Hafner, 229 Ca. Rptr. 676, 689 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (relying
on principles of equity to award one-half of the quasi-marital property to the
putative spouse and one-half to the legal spouse and her children); Union Bank &
Trust, 254 P.2d 644 (denying the claim of the legal wife to a share of the property
acquired during the putative community under the theory of equitable estoppel
because the legal spouse had entered into another marriage); Estate of Vargas, 111
Cal. Rptr. 779 (applying principles of equity to divide the property in half because
the legal and putative wives had each been living as a family with the bigamous
husband). For a compilation of cases discussion the division of quasi-marital
property, see Estate of Hafner, 229 Cal. Rptr. 676.
163. Stevens v. Anderson, 256 P.2d 712, 715 (Ariz. 1953).
164. Lynch v. Lynch, 791 P.2d 653,657 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990); U.S. Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 542 P.2d 825, 827 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975),
overruled, Jackson v. Indus. Comm'n, 592 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Ariz. 1979).
165. Cross v. Cross, 381 P.2d 573, 575 (Ariz. 1963) ("[W]here there was no
valid marriage ... there can be no acquisition of property rights based on their
marital status."); see also Carlson, supra note 195, at 18.
166. See Cross, 381 P.2d at 575 (allowing "wife" to recover funds paid to
improve the "husband's" real property because she contributed labor and money
during the purported marriage that enriched her "husband"); Garza v. Fernandez,
248 P.2d 869, 871-72 (Ariz. 1952) (allowing woman who lived with man as his
wife under the agreement that they would equally divide any joint accumulations
to assert rights to property at his death); see also In re Marriage of Fong, 589 P.2d
1330, 1336-37 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (at dissolution of legal marriage, awarding
husband a greater share of the community property earned during the marriage,
when the husband in good faith had entered into another marriage and had acquired
much of the property during the invalid marriage).
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a good faith putative spouse, it appears that courts will make the
effort to apply equitable principles to reach similar outcomes.
D. Idaho
Idaho recognizes the putative spouse's right to bring a wrongful
death action, but at the death of the common spouse, gives no other
effects to a putative spouse.'67 In fact, in Reichert v. Sunshine Mining
Co.,6 s the Idaho Supreme Court rejected an equitable argument by
the putative spouse who, at the common spouse's death, sought
worker's compensation benefits and the property acquired during the
invalid marriage.' 69 The court awarded all of the property to the legal
spouse, noting that no legal mechanism in Idaho existed to award the
putative spouse with benefits of the marriage even though policy
considerations may dictate otherwise. 70 The Idaho Supreme Court,
however, has indicated that a spouse who in good faith disputes the
invalidity of a marriage that the other spouse seeks to annul may be
allowed temporary alimony and costs of presenting her contention in
the lawsuit.' 7 '
E. Nevada
Nevada, too, adopted its community property laws from Spain but
has failed to recognize the rights of a putative spouse to a portion of
property acquired during a putative marriage. 72 One court in Nevada
recognized the property rights granted to a putative spouse in another
state, but no court in Nevada has construed the rule by name.
The Supreme Court of Nevada, however, has implicitly applied the
167. Idaho Code § 5-311 (1998).
168. 516 P.2d 704 (Idaho 1973).
169. Id. at 706-07 (citing Idaho Code § 15-2-102 (2001)). Because the
common spouse died intestate, the surviving spouse takes all of the community
property.
170. Id. at 706. The Reichert case was decided before the Idaho Legislature
granted putative spouses the right to sue for wrongful death, so its result may be
different today. See Carlson, supra note 195.
171. McGhee v. McGhee, 353 P.2d 760, 764 (Idaho 1960).
172. See Western States Constr., Inc. v. Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220, 1228 n.3 (Nev.
1992); Kelly v. Kelly, 468 P.2d 359, 363 (Nev. 1970).
173. See Western States Construction, Inc., 840 P.2d at 1228 n.3 ("There is no
statutory provision [in Nevada] with respect to a division of property between
parties that acknowledges that even a 'putative' spouse, i.e., one who held a good
faith belief that the marriage was valid, is to be afforded any entitlements which
approximate those of a married person.").
174. But see Warren v. Warren, 579 P.2d 772, 775 (Nev. 1978) (noting that
plaintiff failed to present any evidence to support her claim of putative marriage).
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principles of putative marriage. In Wolford v. Wolford,' 7  the
common spouse entered into a marriage with the putative spouse,
believing that his legal wife was dead."' A prior court had divided
the property acquired during the "putative" marriage equally between
the common and putative spouses as co-owners or tenants in
common.' At the request of the purported husband, the Supreme
Court granted partition of the property by a sale. ' Even though the
court did not set forth a rule under which a putative spouse would be
entitled to relief, the innocent spouse received property acquired
during the invalid union.
F. New Mexico
No court in New Mexico has specifically discussed the putative
marriage rule. Two courts, however, have indicated that innocent
spouses to a null marriage will be entitled to some relief.7 9 Without
using the terms "putative spouse" or "putative marriage," one court
stated that a spouse in good faith that disputes the invalidity of a
marriage may be entitled to interim alimony,8 ° and the other court
suggested that payment for services rendered when there is an
agreement between the parties would be granted to the good faith
spouse of an invalid marriage.' 8 ' Although no court has adopted the
rule, New Mexico courts appear to protect innocent spouses from the
loss of property for entering an invalid marriage.
G. Washington
The State of Washington recognizes the putative marriage rule
but has rejected the classic theory even though its community
property system stems from Spanish heritage. 2 Rather, courts of
Washington have applied principles of equity to divide property of a
putative marriage.' Some courts in Washington have treated the
175. 200 P.2d 988 (Nev. 1948).
176. Id. at 989.
177. Id. at 988-89.
178. Id. at 991.
179. In re Estate of Lamb, 655 P.2d 1001 (N.M. 1982); Prince v. Freeman, 112
P.2d 821 (N.M. 1941).
180. Freeman, 112 P.2dat823.
181. In re Estate of Lamb, 655 P.2dat 1004.
182. In re Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328, 329-31 (Wash. 1984); Creasman
v. Boyle, 196 P.2d 835, 838-39 (Wash. 1948), overruled on other grounds, In re
Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d at 328.
183. In re Marriage of Himes, 965 P.2d 1087, 1100 (Wash. 1998) (finding that
a "putative wife...has equitable interests in the common property acquired during
an illegal marriage"); In re Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d at 332 (adopting a rule
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property earned during the putative community as partnership
property and have awarded the putative spouse one-half of the
property as a partner. 8 4 Regardless of whether courts have relied on
the partnership theory or have simply relied on principles of equity,
the putative spouse is protected.
The case cited most often for the division of community property
in Washington is In re Brenchley's Estate.'85 In Brenchley, the
putative wife lived with her husband for twenty-six years, even
though the marriage was technically invalid.'86  Using the
partnership theory, the court concluded that a woman who lived in
good faith with her putative spouse for twenty-six years was entitled
to one-half of the property of their putative marriage, and the other
half was awarded to the common spouse's children from the first,
legal marriage. 187
The Brenchley decision has been relied on to ensure that an
innocent party receives a fair share of property from the marriage.'88
The Washington Supreme Court has explained, "[i]f the putative
spouse has valid interests, such as rights to property jointly
accumulated during the putative marriage, then the trial court must
shape and balance the relief to protect the interests of both the
putative spouse and the legal spouse.', 189 Although one scholar
insists that Washington does not recognize the putative spouse
of just and equitable division of property); Poole v. Schrichte, 236 P.2d 1044,
1048-49 (Wash. 1951) (noting that "a court of equity will protect the right of an
innocent party in the property accumulated by the joint effort of both" parties);
Creasman, 196 P.2d 835 (noting, in dicta, that if a man and woman enter into a
marriage in good faith and it proves to be void, a court of equity will protect the
rights of the innocent party and the property accumulated by the joint efforts of
both), overruled by In re Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328 (1984); Powers v.
Powers, 200 P. 1080, 1081 (Wash. 1921) (concluding that the court has the power
to award the innocent party a portion of the property to which the party is equitably
and justly entitled); Buckley v. Buckley, 96 P. 1079, 1083 (Wash. 1908) (awarding
putative spouse the proportion of property which under all circumstances was just
and equitable).
184. See Knoll v. Knoll, 176 P. 22,24 (Wash. 1918) (concluding that as long as
the parties lived together as husband and wife in good faith, upon annulment of the
marriage, the property should be divided equally between them as partners); In re
Brenchley's Estate, 164 P. 913, 915 (Wash. 1917) (treating the property acquired
during the putative marriage as partnership property and awarding one-half of the
partnership property to the putative spouse).
185. 164 P. 913 (Wash. 1917).
186. Id. at 914.
187. Id.; but see Buckley v. Buckley, 96 P. 1079, 1080 (Wash. 1908) in which
the court, at dissolution of the marriage while the parties were still alive, awarded
the legal and the putative wives with one-quarter of the property and award the
common spouse with one-half.




rule,' 90 the courts apply its principles with reliance on equity to
protect the innocent spouse.
H. Wisconsin
In 1986, Wisconsin adopted the Uniform Marital Property Act
and became a community property state.' 9' Although the putative
marriage rule is not present in Wisconsin per se, good faith parties
to invalid marriages can have their marriages recognized as valid
after the impediment has been removed. 92 Additionally, at least
one court has concluded in a wrongful death suit that if both parties
in good faith believe their marriage to be valid, they are entitled to
legal effects of a marriage.' 93 Furthermore, Wisconsin law provides
that any property of parties to an invalid marriage can be divided "as
is necessary to avoid an inequitable result."' Even though the
scheme is statutory in Wisconsin, some aspects of putative marriage
exist.'"95
V. CURING THE PITFALLS: A SUGGESTION FOR REVISION
To cure the pitfalls present in Louisiana law, the time has come
for Louisiana to adopt a mechanism-a putative divorce-that puts
an end to the legal community and allows the putative community
to begin. 96 Like a putative marriage, a putative divorce would
separate the communities and allow the spouses who contribute to
each community to reap the benefits of that community at the other's
death.'97 One French scholar reached the same conclusion by
suggesting successive and separate liquidation of each community
regime to achieve equal treatment of the putative spouse.' 98
190. Harry M. Cross, The Community Property Law in Washington, 61 Wash.
L. Rev. 13, 20 (1986).
191. See Wisc. Stat. § 766.001 etseq. (2001).
192. Wisc. Stat. § 765.24.
193. Xiong ex rel. Edmondson v. Xiong, 648 N.W.2d 900, 905 (Wisc. App.
2002).
194. Wisc. Stat. § 766.73.
195. See John W. Carlson, Putative Spouses in Texas Courts, 7 Tex. Wesleyan
L. Rev. 1 (2000).
196. The need for a putative divorce as a counterpart to a putative marriage was
first advanced by Professor Robert Pascal in 1957. Pascal, supra note 107, at 305.
Professor Pascal notes that the term "putative divorce" was suggested to him by
Fred Godwin, a student author of a related note. Id. (citing Godwin, supra note 99).
197. Blakesley, supra note 8, at 38-39; Pascal, supra note 107, at 303; Godwin,
supra note 99, at 491. Each of these authors suggest that two separate communities
can exist.
198. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. Interestingly, Aubry and
Rau considered the legal community, from the legal marriage until contraction of
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To adopt the concept of putative divorce, Louisiana need not stray
from the classic civilian doctrine of putative marriage.'99 Putative
spouses should be entitled to the same community property rights as the
legal spouse. The idea that, like the legal spouse, the putative spouse is
entitled to a share of the community has been parlayed into the principle
that both the legal and the putative spouse must take from the same
community.2" That need not be the case. With the aid of the putative
divorce, the legal community could end and the putative community
could begin. Each community would consist only of two spouses
contributing and withdrawing from their community, and the legal
spouse would be entitled to a share of the putative community in certain
limited circumstances.2 °'
When dividing property between the legal and putative spouses who
equally have a claim to the same share, it is nearly impossible to ensure
that neither spouse suffers any prejudice. Each is legally entitled to
one-half of the putative community. In Louisiana today, however, the
legal spouse is entitled to one-fourth of the putative community, due to
her technical relationship and regardless of her actual relationship with
the common spouse. 2 Use of the putative divorce would prevent the
status of the legal spouse from being elevated over the innocent,
intimate working-relationship with the putative spouse. °3 Although
separating the two communities by a putative divorce may, in some
cases, benefit the putative spouse, such benefit is appropriate in light of
the relative ease at which the legal spouse can terminate the community
and the makeup of today's family.7
the putative marriage, to be "fictitiously liquidated" in favor of the legal spouse at
the time the putative marriage was created. Aubry et Rau, supra note 37, at 76.
Use of the putative divorce would likewise result in fictitious liquidation of the
legal community, but contrary to Aubry and Rau's views, the legal spouse generally
would have no share in the second community.
199. See Blakesley, supra note 8, at 40 (noting that Louisiana is the only state
that follows the classic civil law putative marriage rule).
200. See id. at 38 (recognizing the theory that a legal spouse has an interest in
the community property acquired by the putative spouse during the simultaneous
existence of the legal and putative marriages); Prince, 89 So. 2d at 132-33
(concluding that the property entered the putative community but allowing the legal
wife to enjoy a share of it); see also Pascal, supra note 107, at 303.
201. By separating the communities, each would then meet the Civil Code's
definition of a matrimonial regime, which consists of two, not three, spouses. See
La. Civ. Code art. 2325; see also Godwin, supra note 99, at 491 ("A concept of two
communities is entirely consistent with the Code articles on community property.");
supra notes 106-107 and accompanying text.
202. Patton, 1 La. Ann. at 106; see also supra note 75.
203. See Homes, supra note 7, at 119 (submitting that there are strong
considerations for favoring the putative wife over the legal wife in most community
property situations).
204. See infra Section V(A)(3).
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A. The Putative Divorce
Logistically, how would the putative divorce function? The
putative divorce would function the same as any divorce-the
community property regime would terminate at the time the putative
divorce became effective." 5 The putative divorce would take effect
at the earlier of 1) filing suit for divorce even' if the divorce was
legally invalid or 2) contracting the putative marriage. 2 6 The bad
faith of the common spouse would not prevent his heirs from
succeeding to his estate. Indeed, his heirs would be entitled to inherit
the community share of assets that the bad faith spouse would not be
entitled to if he were alive.2 7 Additionally, equity would enter the
analysis when no divorce was attempted and the legal spouse could
demonstrate, based on a number of factors, an entitlement to a share
of the property acquired during the putative community.
1. Filing suit for divorce even if the divorce was legally
invalid
Take again for example, A (the legal spouse), B (the putative
spouse), and C (the common spouse) as presented above. If C left A
in the good faith belief that the marriage had legally terminated by
divorce and he married B, the putative divorce would take place at
the moment C or A filed the legally invalid divorce. C and A would
share equally in the legal community and C and B in the putative
community. C's heirs would receive his share of the community
property from both marriages. B's rights as the putative spouse
would be preserved and A, even though technically a legal wife,
would take only from the community to which she contributed.
In this situation, the parties intended to end the community
property regime. A, therefore, should not be granted a share of
property acquired during the putative community. Whether or not C
205. Currently, the legal regime terminates "by the death or judgment of
declaration ofdeath of a spouse, declaration of the nullity of the marriage, judgment
of divorce or separation of property, or matrimonial agreement that terminates the
community." La. Civ. Code art. 2356. A putative divorce likewise would terminate
the regime. The author recognizes, but leaves unanswered, the effect that a putative
divorce could have on other incidents to divorce, such as an award of alimony or
reimbursement claims between spouses.
206. It is the author's preference that putative divorce should be adopted into
Book I of the Civil Code after article 96 to ensure a statutory foundation and proper
integration into the Code.
207. The bad faith of either putative spouse will prevent the civil effects from
flowing to that spouse during the spouse's lifetime. La. Civ. Code art. 96. At the
time of death, however, the bad faith of the common spouse would not affect his or
her heirs.
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or A remarried, both spouses believed that their marriage had ended
and all rights to property acquired by their ex-spouse had ceased.
Causing the putative divorce to take place at the time the parties
believed that the community terminated realizes the parties'
expectations and assures that the legal spouse does not receive an
unearned, unexpected gratuity.
2. Contracting the putative marriage
A more difficult question arises when no divorce was attempted,
but the spouses separate. In that case, if C left A and married B
knowing that he was legally married to A, the putative divorce would
take place at the moment he contracted the putative marriage with B.
The legal community would begin at the moment of the valid
marriage and would end when the putative marriage was
contracted.0 The putative community would begin at the putative
marriage and end at C's death. Any property acquired by C or A
during the legal marriage would enter the legal community and would
be shared equally by them and any property acquired by C or B
during the putative marriage would enter the putative community and
would be shared equally by them. Again, C's heirs would receive his
share of the community property from both marriages.
Not raised by this example is the potential harm to the legal
spouse by causing a putative divorce without her knowledge or
consent. For example, a common spouse could leave his legal spouse
and enter into a putative marriage, while his legal spouse, having no
desire to remarry, awaits his return. Even more egregious, a deceitful
common spouse could carry on separate lives, one with the legal
spouse and the other with a putative spouse. In either situation,
because the legal community ends when the putative marriage begins,
the legal spouse is no longer entitled to property acquired by the
common spouse after he enters the putative marriage. 209  To
ameliorate any harm to the legal spouse, property from the putative
community would be available to the legal spouse in certain
circumstances.210
To explain, some have suggested that property acquired during
the existence of a putative marriage should be divided among the
legal and putative spouses based on which party acquired the
property.2 " Under this theory, the legal and the putative
208. If C did not remarry, the legal community would end at his death.
209. The reverse is also true. If the legal spouse acquires property at the time
when the common spouse has entered the putative marriage, the common spouse
will have no claim to that property.
210. See infra Section V(A)(3).
211. Pascal, supra note 107, at 303-04; Blakesley, supra note 8, at 39.
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communities coexist. If the legal spouse or the putative spouse
acquired property during the putative marriage, that property would
remain in their respective communities. Consequently, the legal
spouse would not be entitled to a share of the property acquired by
the putative spouse. If, however, the common spouse acquired
property during the putative marriage, that property would enter both
communities.22 In this author's opinion, property acquired during
the putative marriage-by either the common or the putative spouse
-should remain in the putative community. Just as the putative
spouse has no right to property in the legal community, the legal
spouse should have no right to the property in the putative
community unless the legal spouse can demonstrate, based on several
factors, the requisite entitlement to such property.
21 3
3. Entitlement to property in the putative community by the
legal spouse
The legal spouse, in certain circumstances, should have a claim
to a portion of the putative community.214 To determine whether the
legal spouse can demonstrate an entitlement to certain property,
certain factors should be considered: a) the contact between the legal
and the common spouse, b) the legal spouse's understanding of the
marital status of the common spouse, and c) whether the legal spouse
received any benefit or enjoyment from property in the putative
212. Pascal, supra note 107, at 303-04 (noting that the value of property
entering each community would be governed by equity); Blakesley, supra note 8,
at 39 (concluding that reliance on equity would be necessary to divide the property
into both communities).
213. Although some scholars have suggested that the legal spouse should only
be able to recover property acquired by the common spouse, see Pascal, supra note
107, at 303, Blakesley, supra note 8, at 39, the legal spouse may be disadvantaged
if the common spouse places assets in the name of the putative spouse. If, for
example, the putative spouse purchased property in her name with community
funds, but the common spouse allowed the legal spouse to use the property (most
likely without knowledge of the putative spouse). The legal spouse should not be
prevented from collecting a share of the property because the property was acquired
in the name of the putative spouse. Based on community property principles,
whether it was purchased by either spouse, it presumptively enters the community
between them. La. Civ. Code art. 2340 (the presumption is rebuttable).
Consequently, if the legal spouse could demonstrate an entitlement to the property
based on her relationship with the common spouse, even if the property was
acquired by the putative spouse, the legal spouse should be protected.
214. Two other authors have also recognized the potential harm to a legal spouse
if she is denied any right to claim property in the putative community. See
Blakesley, supra note 8, at 39; Homes, supra note 7, at 125. Mr. Homes argues that
a legal spouse should have a claim against the community only where she has been
"truly wronged" and suggesting that positive economic need ought to be shown to
constitute a wrong. Homes, supra note 7, at 125.
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community." 5 These factors should be weighed against each other
to award the legal spouse a share of property from the putative
marriage when equity so dictates.
For example, in the case of the bigamous spouse leading two
separate lives, the legal spouse may be able to demonstrate an
entitlement to property in the putative community through her
continued contact with the common spouse and her ignorance of the
putative marriage. It seems equitable that if two wives coexist in
relationships with the common spouse, ignorant of the other's
marriage, neither should receive a greater benefit in property than the
other. In the case of a common spouse who abandoned his legal
wife, however, the legal spouse may have to demonstrate that she
received a benefit or enjoyment from property acquired during the
putative community to establish her entitlement. For example, if the
legal spouse, who had little interaction with the common spouse and
was unaware of his second marriage, was given a car to use by the
common spouse, she may be entitled to a share of that property at his
death even if it was acquired during the putative community. 216
Again, it seems equitable that if the legal spouse, believing that she
is married, uses property that she thinks entered her patrimony, she
should be entitled to a share of the property notwithstanding the
putative marriage.
By focusing on the actual relationship between the legal and the
common spouse, the status of the legal spouse is appropriately
elevated when her marriage with the common spouse is more than a
mere formality. Otherwise, the putative spouse, who shares the
responsibilities of a conventional marriage-working together,
mutually assuming responsibilities, and enjoying benefits-should be
protected against claims of a spouse who had no involvement in the
putative community.
During the putative marriage, in most circumstances, the legal
wife neither contributes to nor withdraws from the putative
community. When one spouse leaves the other, even if the other
spouse did not want a divorce or separation, the other spouse (i.e. the
legal spouse) has limited involvement in building the putative
community. 27 Although technically the legal community does not
215. If the legal spouse is aware of the putative marriage, it seems implausible
that she would be able to demonstrate an entitlement to property. See Pascal, supra
note 107, at 304 (noting that it would be an abuse of the law to allow the legal
spouse to collect property acquired by the common spouse during the putative
community if the legal spouse has knowledge of the putative marriage and does
nothing to prevent or terminate it).
216. If the legal spouse demonstrates an entitlement to property, its division
among the legal and putative spouse should be left to the discretion of the court.
217. It is possible that the legal spouse's share of the legal community could be
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end until the marriage is terminated,2 8 the institution of marriage and
the contributions into and withdrawals from the community by the
legal spouse generally terminate before the putative marriage begins.
The putative spouse, rather than the legal spouse, should be entitled
to her full one-half share of the assets acquired during the community
in which she contributed as an equal partner in the marriage.
Fairness dictates that the parties enjoying and contributing to the
community property regime ultimately take pleasure in its benefits.
The law should not elevate the formal tie between the legal and
common spouse over the mutual participation and productivity of the
putative spouses. 219 The innocent, putative spouse lives the life of a
legal spouse in all respects except technical validity. Indeed, the
putative spouse is recognized in the community as the actual spouse,
lives with the common spouse, and enjoys the benefits and detriments
of a conventional marriage--devoid only of the formality of legal
marriage.220
The putative spouse deserves protection from the claims of the
legal spouse who reaps the benefit of the putative spouse's work.22" '
All of the community property states that have considered the issue
consistently protect the innocent spouse.222 In addition, the children
of the decedent, as the priming class of successors, should benefit
from the fruits of their parent's labor. Even though one Texas court
recognized what this writer believes is the correct separation of
communities, that court allowed the legal spouse to enjoy property to
the detriment of the decedent's children based on her technical status
alone.223
With the advent of a putative divorce, the legal spouse is not
forgotten. The legal spouse remains protected if her level of
interaction with the common spouse or property acquired during the
used to build the putative community. At all times, though, the legal spouse is
entitled to property acquired during the legal community.
218. See La. Civ. Code art. 2356.
219. See Homes, supra note 7, at 122 (noting that the concept of community
property is dependent on the active participation of two partners joined in a vital
relationship, not the formality of marriage between two partners); Pascal, supra
note 107, at 305 (suggesting that effects of marriage should be withheld if the
parties, although technically married, do not believe themselves to be married).
220. See Chavis, 29 So. 2d at 864; Homes, supra note 7, at 122-23.
221. Homes, supra note 7, at 122 ("[T]o allow the legal wife to participate in the
putative community in that situation would usually work an injustice to the parties
in the putative relationship who have worked together to acquire the property, and
at the same time would constitute a pure gratuity to the legal wife who, although
legally united to one of the parties to the putative relationship, has in no way
participated in the very relationship which is the foundation of the community
property theory.").
222. See supra Section IV.
223. Parker, 222 F. at 194; see supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
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putative marriage elevates her above a technical, non-participating
spouse. Additionally, because the putative divorce takes effect at the
earlier of contracting the putative marriage or filing the invalid
divorce, the legal spouse would be entitled to one-half of the property
acquired while the other spouse lived alone-even when separated
from the legal spouse.224 If the common spouse never remarried or
filed for divorce, the legal regime would persist until the common
spouse's death.225
The legal spouse in today's society needs less protection than the
legal spouse of years past. In the lines of cases stemming from
Patton and Prince, legal wives were left behind by their husbands,
often faced with a difficult and lengthy process to obtain a divorce.226
The husbands were the heads of the households, and the wives, who
did not work outside of the home, were left behind with either
promises of divorce or promises for a return. Today, the makeup of
the family has changed. Wives are not only wage-earners in the
family, but can obtain a divorce more quickly 27 and can unilaterally
obtain a separation of property.
228
If the legal spouse learns of the putative marriage or is abandoned
by the common spouse, she can terminate the community. In fact,
the putative divorce would protect any assets acquired by the legal
spouse from claims of the common spouse. If the community is not
terminated, both spouses are entitled to a share of the other's
acquisitions. After the putative divorce, all acquisitions made in the
name of the legal spouse would be the legal spouse's separate
property and all those made by the common spouse would enter the
putative community.229
224. The community is not terminated by mere separation. See La. Civ. Code
art. 2356 for the causes of termination of the community regime. By giving the
legal spouse one-half of the community property acquired while the other spouse
is separated but has failed to file a divorce, there is an incentive for the other spouse
to properly terminate the regime through a judgment of divorce or separation of
property.
225. See id. (providing that death terminates the community property regime).
226. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana Practice Series: Family law in
Louisiana §§ 7.1-7.7 (3d ed. 2000) for a discussion of the progression of
development of the law of divorce from 1808 to the present.
227. See La. Civ. Code arts. 102, 103(1) (1999) (providing that a divorce can be
granted after living separate and apart continuously for one hundred and eighty
days).
228. See La. Civ. Code art. 2374 (1999) (providing that "[w]hen the interest of
a spouse in a community property regime is threatened to be diminished by the
fraud, fault, neglect or incompetence of the other spouse, or by the disorder of
affairs of the other spouse, he may obtain a judgment decreeing separation of
property," and "[w]hen a spouse is an absent person, the other spouse is entitled to
a judgment decreeing separation of property.").
229. If the legal spouse remarried as well, all acquisitions would enter the legal
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Without so stating, one Louisiana court has applied the concept
of putative divorce by awarding the putative spouse and the heirs of
the common spouse property acquired during the putative
community. In Succession of Chavis,2 the common spouse married
his second, putative wife having obtained only a separation from bed
and board from his first wife but not a judgment of divorce.23' Prior
to his death but during his putative marriage, the common spouse
acquired two pieces of property, to which the legal wife asserted a
claim. Failing to cite its own decision in Patton, the Chavis court
awarded the putative spouse one-half of the property and the children
of the common spouse, both from the legal and the putative marriage,
the other one-half of the property.23 2 The legal spouse received no
portion of the property acquired during the putative community
because "she [did] not appear to have contributed a penny to the
acquisition or improvement of the property involved in [the] suit"
and "[the property] was acquired entirely through the union of the
labors of [the putative spouses]. 233  Even though there was no
mention of a putative divorce, the court allowed the putative spouses
to contribute to a separate community to which the legal spouse had
no claim-the practical effect of a putative divorce.
Many formulas can be advocated to legally divide the putative
community and, with any of these formulas, one if not all of the
parties' legal rights will be compromised.2 35 When considering the
reality of putative marriage, one solution captures the balance of
equality and fairness, and that solution is accomplished by
recognizing two communities separated by the putative divorce. To
achieve the appropriate balance between the legal and putative
spouses, Louisiana courts should not only consider the analysis of
spouse's putative community.
230. 29 So. 2d 860 (La. 1947).
231. Id.at 861.
232. Id. at 864. See also Jones v. Squire, 69 So. 733, 737 (La. 1915) in which
the Louisiana Supreme Court, without any reference to its decision in Patton,
awarded one-half of the putative community to the putative spouse and the other
half to the child of the common spouse from the legal marriage, even though the
legal spouse was alive.
233. Chavis, 29 So. 2d at 864. The court did not consider whether the common
spouse was in bad faith.
234. See Homes, supra note 7, at 126-27 (citing Chavis as the correct
application of the putative marriage rule when the common spouse dies leaving
both legal and putative wives).
235. See id. at 122-23 (taking the position that the solutions in the Patton and
Prince cases are unfair to the putative spouse); Pascal, supra note 107, at 304
(suggesting two solutions: one in which the common spouse receives one-half and
the legal and putative spouses split the other one-half and the second giving all
three parties an equal one-third share).
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other states236 but, as instructed by the Civil Code, should rely on
principles of equity.
237
B. Effect on Patton and Prince
A putative divorce solves the problems presented in Patton and
Prince. First, the Patton line of cases, which awards the legal and
putative spouses the entirety of the common spouse's community at
his death, is outmoded and outdated. While the goal of the Patton
case was to punish bigamous spouses, the only persons punished on
his death are the bad faith spouse's testate and intestate heirs.
Second, the Prince line of cases, in attempting to protect the heirs of
the common spouse, unduly prejudices the innocent, putative spouse.
The putative divorce not only protects the heirs of the common
spouse, even if the common spouse is in bad faith, but strikes the
appropriate balance between the legal and putative spouses.
1. Patton inappropriately punishes the heirs of the common
spouse
Reliance on the Patton case is fraught with problems, most
notably the application of Spanish law, which is no longer a part of
positive law in Louisiana.23 Under the Spanish regime, bigamous
spouses were punished for their infidelity by being denied any share
in the community property earned during the invalid marriage.239
Rather than punish the bigamist, the division of property unfairly
punished the heirs of the bigamous spouse, who were denied any
inheritance from their ascendant. 4
Admittedly, there is some appeal in punishing spouses who
knowingly lure another into a marriage knowing it to be a sham.
236. A California appeals court considered the case of Estate of Vargas, 111
Cal. Rptr. 779 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974), in which the decedent had lived a double life
for twenty-four years as a husband and father to two separate families. The court
recognized that its laws are not designed to cope with the extraordinary
circumstance of purposeful bigamy and therefore resorting to equitable principles
was mandatory. Id. at 781. Using equitable principles, the court divided the estate
one-half to each spouse. Id.
237. The Civil Code provides that "[w]hen no rule for a particular situation can
be derived from legislation or custom, the court is bound to proceed according to
equity." La. Civ. Code art. 4; see also Pascal, supra note 107, at 303.
238. See Hubbell, 7 La. Ann. at 252 (recognizing that Spanish law was no longer
in force in Louisiana but still applying its principles as background for
interpretation); see also Henderson, supra note 31, at 58; and Homes, supra note
7, at 121.
239. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
240. See Prince, 89 So. 2d at 133; Homes, supra note 7, at 124; Godwin, supra
note 99, at 490 n.6.
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Prior to the death of the bigamous spouse, Louisiana law provides
such a punishment. Article 96 of the Civil Code allows civil effects
of a putative marriage to flow only to the party in good faith.24' If the
bigamous spouse is not in good faith at the inception of the putative
marriage, civil effects will never flow to him.242 The Louisiana Third
Circuit in Price v. Price 243 denied civil effects to a common spouse
when the legal and putative spouses were still living. In Price, the
putative wife sought a declaration of nullity after learning of her
husband's prior undissolved marriage. Because she was in good
faith, she sought one-half of a piece of property acquired by her
husband during the putative marriage. 2" The court awarded one-half
of the property to the good faith putative spouse and the other half to
the legal spouse based on Patton, thereby denying the common
spouse any share in the property.245
Based on Price, the rule articulated by the Patton court makes
sense when the putative marriage is discovered while the bigamous
husband is still alive.246 Because the bad faith, bigamous spouse is
not entitled to civil effects of the putative marriage, one-half of the
community belongs to his putative spouse and the other half belongs
to his legal wife, under the principle that the legal spouse has a legal
entitlement to one-half of all the property acquired during the
marriage.2
47
The appeal to punish bigamous spouses, however, loses its luster
once the bigamous spouse dies. The heirs of the bigamous spouse
suffer, rather than the one who committed the wrong.248 French
scholars failed to embrace this punishment rationale and recognized
the right of the bigamist to property that he earned during the
241. Article 96 also contains an exception for spouses who are putative as a
result of the other spouse's prior undissolved marriage. La. Civ. Code art. 96. Civil
effects will continue, despite the putative spouse's knowledge of the prior
undissolved marriage. Id. Because that exception applies to the putative spouse,
and not the common spouse, it is inapplicable in this context.
242. Id.
243. 326 So. 2d 545 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
244. Id. at 549.
245. Id. Because the Price case dealt with division of one piece of property, it
is not known whether a court would deny a bad faith common spouse any share of
his earnings during the putative marriage.
246. See id. (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976) (applying Patton in a divorce when both
putative spouses were still alive); Pascal, supra note 107, at 304 (noting that
generally the rule in Patton and depriving the common spouse of any community
property is equitable when the common spouse is in bad faith).
247. See Price, 326 So. 2d at 549.
248. See Harriet S. Daggett, Work of the Supreme Court: Successions,
Donations and Community Property, 14 La. L. Rev. 152, 162 (1953) (noting that
to punish a dead bigamist by preventing his children from inheriting was illogical).
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marriage.2 49 In fact, the interpretation inPatton contradicts the spirit of
article 96, which specifically grants civil effects to the children of a
putative marriage when one spouse is in good faith.250 Applying Patton,
the children are denied inheritance from their parent (the bad faith
spouse) even though the other parent is in good faith. Even if the right
of inheritance persists, there is nothing to inherit because the
community property has been forfeited to the putative spouse.25'
Inheritance becomes meaningless to the child, thus violating the spirit
of article 96.
The Patton case has been applied in a number of cases since its
decision in 1846.252 In Succession of Choyce,253 the five children of a
man who had entered into a putative marriage were denied any
inheritance in favor of a legal wife who had lived with the decedent for
two years and believed that she had been divorced from decedent.254
Initially, the trial court awarded the putative wife one-half of the
property and the five children as his legal heirs the other half.255 The
appellate court reversed, focusing solely on the common husband who,
the court concluded, was in bad faith.2"6 Because the husband entered
a fifteen year marriage in bad faith, his children did not inherit his share
of the community property and the legal and putative spouses were
awarded equal proportions.257
The result in this case highlights the windfall to the legal spouse,
who, due to a technical relationship, will enjoy property to the
detriment of decedent's children. Courts have recognized that the
rationale in Patton is no longer appropriate or applicable in Louisiana.25 8
249. Aubry et Rau, supra note 37, at 72 n.18; see also Vazeille, supra note 37,§ 285.
250. See Prince, 89 So. 2d at 132 ("To follow the Patton rule in the instant case
and to give to the putative wife the husband's one-half of the property acquired
during the existence of the putative community would be to deny to him and his
heirs the civil effects of the second marriage, in the teeth of the provisions of
Article 117."). For an interesting discussion of why the Patton case violates the
principles of the Civil Code, see Henderson, supra note 31, at 61-62.
251. For a discussion of the anomalous results when applying the forfeiture
theory, see Homes, supra note 7, at 121-22.
252. See supra note 75.
253. 183 So. 2d 457 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
254. Id. at 458-59. Indeed, the legal wife had entered into another marriage.
Id. at 458.
255. Id. at 457.
256. Id. at 458-59. The court's conclusion was based on scant evidence. The
common husband in his marriage license to his putative wife stated that he had not
been married, but in statements made to his putative and legal wives, he
acknowledged the marriage and said that he had been divorced. Id. at 459.
257. Id. at 459.
258. See Prince, 89 So. 2d at 132 (noting that the Patton case, which prevents
children from inheriting community property from a father who contracted a
marriage in bad faith, is an incorrect interpretation of Article 118 of the Civil
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Creation and application of a putative divorce would ameliorate the
consequences present in Patton.
2. The result in Prince unduly prejudices the innocent spouse
The result in Prince allowed an absent, legal wife to prevent the
putative spouse from realizing her full share of property earned
during her putative marriage. With the use of the putative divorce,
the putative spouse in Prince would have been able to retain her full
one-half interest in property of the putative community. Essentially,
the putative divorce serves the exact same function as the putative
marriage. The parties intend for the community property regime to
end and simply need a legal device-the putative divorce-to give
them the legal effect of a divorce and terminate the regime. In
Prince, because the legal spouses attempted to get a divorce, which
was later discovered to be invalid, the putative divorce would have
become effective at the time the divorce petition was filed.
Even if the legal spouses had simply parted ways, without
attempting the divorce, the result would be the same. Because the
property was acquired after the putative marriage, the property would
remain in the putative community. The facts in Prince do not suggest
that the legal spouse could demonstrate an entitlement to the property
based on any ongoing relationship with the common spouse. In fact,
she married someone else.
Similar to the inequitable results caused by application of Patton,
the Prince interpretation has produced unfortunate consequences for
the putative spouse. In the Succession of Gordon,259 the common
spouse had been married to his legal spouse for approximately five
years and then married his putative spouse, with whom he remained
married for thirty-eight years.2" At issue was the common spouse's
succession, which contained one piece of property purchased during
the putative community. 26' Because the court concluded that the
common and putative spouses entered the marriage in good faith, the
heirs were awarded one-half of the property and the putative spouse
had to relinquish one-half of her share to the legal spouse.262
Using the putative divorce, the putative spouse would have been
entitled to keep her share of the putative community. The property
Code). In fact, as early as 1892, the Louisiana Supreme Court realized the
impending problems of Patton. See Jermann v. Tenneas, 11 So. 80 (La. 1892)
(hinting that children of the common spouse should inherit from him under the
French system, regardless of the spouse's bad faith).
259. 461 So. 2d 357 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984).
260. Id. at 359-61.
261. Id. at 358.
262. Id. at 365.
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was purchased during the putative community and absent any
evidence of the legal spouse's entitlement to a share of the property,
the property would have been shared by the putative spouse and the
heirs of the common spouse. The legal spouse in Gordon lived out
of state for many years after the separation and claimed to have no
knowledge of the putative marriage.26 Further, she testified that she
had been in contact with the common spouse, who purportedly told
her that he would never divorce her.2" If the testimony of the legal
spouse was deemed credible, the trial court could have awarded a
certain share of the property to the legal spouse.
VI. CONCLUSION
The putative divorce strikes the balance between the legal and
putative spouses, while protecting the claims of the successors of the
common spouse. The current state of the law and jurisprudence in
Louisiana fails to adequately protect the successors of the common
spouse as well as the innocent putative spouse. In addition, the legal
spouse in most cases enjoys a windfall of property from the putative
community.
Ultimately, the putative divorce will protect the property interest
of all of the spouses. A spouse can lose a share of his or her
community acquisitions to a spouse not participating in the marriage
relationship. For example, at the death of the common spouse, the
putative spouse could owe a share of her community property to the
legal spouse, with whom she had no relationship. Two communities
would accomplish a just division of ownership. Spouses who work
together in their marriage, legal or putative, should share equally in
the community acquired between them.
A putative divorce will have consequences beyond the division
of community property discussed in this article. A putative divorce
may affect matters incidental to divorce, such as reimbursement
claims between spouses and awards of alimony. Additionally, as
civil unions are integrated into the law of some jurisdictions, putative
divorce principles can be applied in that context as well.
Notwithstanding its potential reach, the purpose of putative
divorce-to meet the parties' expectations and prevent an unjust
division of property-should form the backbone of its application in
Louisiana and beyond.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 360.
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